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 The unheralded line that separates Canada and the United States 
is the longest unfortified border in the world today, and perhaps in 
all of history. It says to mankind: Let not the cartographers rule, 
elevate nature and human friendship. 
  Stewart L. Udall 
  United States Secretary of the Interior, 1967 
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INTRODUCTION1 
stride the Continental Divide, the Crown of the Continent is one 
of the largest jewels of our natural inheritance.2 It spans both 
sides of the international border, is embellished by majestic peaks, 
and is home to the most diverse array of wildlife in the Northern 
Rockies, including many species on the brink of extinction. Despite 
widely recognized ecological values of international importance,3 the 
pristine qualities of the area remain threatened and its governance 
fractured. While the core reservations of the Glacier and Waterton 
Lakes National Parks provide for the protection of portions of the 
region, much of the adjacent land in both Canada and the United 
States remains open to extractive uses, despite public ownership. 
These unprotected lands are smaller jewels of the Crown and a vital 
part of its unique and diverse ecosystem. 
Beyond land and ecological benefits, the Crown is also rich in 
natural resource commodities—principally timber, metals, coal, oil, 
and gas. Indeed, Canada’s second oil well was drilled in Waterton 
near the turn of the century.4 Coal mining occurs in the Elk River 
Valley in Canada, while coal bed methane natural gas drilling has also 
 
1 This Article has its genesis in a presentation given by Jack Tuholske at McGill 
University in June 2011 at the Vermont Law School/McGill University Sustainability 
Conference. The authors want to acknowledge Professor of Law and former Dean Kinvin 
Wroth for his long-standing promotion of cross-border sustainability and for encouraging 
the development of this Article.  
2 The term “Crown of the Continent” was first coined by the naturalist William Bird 
Grinnell, one of Glacier National Park’s early explorers and champions. About the Crown 
of the Continent, CROWN OF THE CONTINENT, http://www.crownofthecontinent.net 
/about.php (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). The term is now widely used to describe the 
ecosystem that extends along the Rocky Mountain spine from the Bob Marshall 
Wilderness Complex in Montana to the Elk Valley in British Columbia. 
3 As The Nature Conservancy explains, “[t]he Crown enfolds over 18-million acres of 
some of the most intact wildland on the entire continent. All the plants and animals seen 
here during the expedition of Lewis and Clark still survive here. It is essential home range 
for wildlife and a key intersection connecting vital habitat in Glacier National Park, the 
Bob Marshall and the Salmon-Selway wilderness areas.” Montana: The Crown of the 
Continent, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions 
/northamerica/unitedstates/montana/placesweprotect/crown-of-the-continent.xml (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
4 National Historic Sites in the Mountain National Parks: First Oil Well in Western 
Canada National Historic Site of Canda, PARKS CAN., http://www.pc.gc.ca/docs/v-g/pm   
-mp/lhn-nhs/puits-well_e.asp (last modified Sept. 11, 2009). 
A
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been proposed in Canada.5 And not to be left behind, the United 
States has oil and gas deposits on both sides of the Continental 
Divide. 
Governance of the Crown is complex: international treaties, a 
United Nations World Heritage Site designation, First Nation rights, 
Federal U.S. and Canadian environmental laws, and state and 
provincial laws all affect management of the area in a dizzying array 
of overlapping jurisdictions. To add to this complexity, the resources 
that make the area unique are elusive in their transboundary nature, in 
that rivers, wildlife, and oil and gas deposits are not confined to 
national borders. 
For the past thirty years, energy development proposals in Canada 
framed the legal and political difficulties inherent in managing this 
transboundary resource. The North Fork of the Flathead River6—
home to endangered bull trout while simultaneously underlain by rich 
coal deposits—has provided the setting for several transboundary 
environmental disputes. The river originates in Canada, where the 
coal deposits occur, and flows south through Glacier National Park in 
the United States. Proposed Canadian mining would provide jobs, tax 
revenue, and corporate profit in Canada, but send mining pollution 
downstream into U.S. and Montana waters. With the threat of 
development looming, the conflict over coal mining very nearly 
erupted into an ugly international environmental dispute. However, 
and unlike other transboundary environmental disputes, this one has a 
happy and prompt ending: coal mines have not been built, mining 
rights have been retired on hundreds of thousands of acres on both 
sides of the border, and state and provincial politicians have led the 
way in working towards ecologically sustainable governance even in 
the absence of any hard legal obligation to do so. 
What can be learned from the positive resolution of a complex 
international environmental dispute? 
Part I of this Article examines the Crown as both a rich ecological 
commons and source of commodity resources, while explaining that 
 
5 See Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, Glacier National Park and Its Neighbors: A 
Study of Federal Interagency Relations, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207 (1987) (highlighting the 
myriad of threats facing Glacier National Park in 1987). 
6 Originating along the western flank of the Crown in an undisturbed area of 
southeastern British Columbia, the North Fork flows south into Montana, forming the west 
boundary of Glacier National Park. It eventually flows into Flathead Lake, the largest 
freshwater lake west of the Mississippi. Flathead Lake, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia 
.org/wiki/Flathead_Lake (last modified Dec. 17, 2013). 
TUHOLSKI (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  12:24 PM 
2014] Solving Transboundary Pollution Disputes Locally: 653 
Success in the Crown of the Continent 
management of these resources is inherently fractured due to the 
nineteenth-century political compromise drawing the international 
boundary at the 49th parallel.7 Part II outlines relevant international, 
national, and subnational legal principles, both hard and soft law, that 
could potentially bear on resolving transboundary environmental 
disputes in the Crown. Part III provides an overview of U.S. and 
Canadian environmental law that is relevant to both the dispute in the 
North Fork of the Flathead and to the larger issue of ecosystem 
governance. Part IV provides a summary of the factors that led to a 
successful resolution of this dispute, including the role of 
international law and norms, the importance of subnational political 
actors, the principle of subsidiarity, and the development of a 
nonbinding Memorandum of Agreement that has been successfully 
implemented on both sides of the border. We conclude in Parts V and 
VI that a “soft-law” based subnational resolution of this 
transboundary dispute was far more effective than using traditional 
international law. In Part V we show how subnational actors 
negotiated a nonbinding agreement with reciprocal responsibilities 
that would protect the North Fork and lead to more sustainable, 
transboundary governance of the entire Crown. The provincial and 
state governments spurred action to retire coal leases and protect vast 
swaths of additional lands within the Crown. The subnational actors 
were able to spur the U.S. federal government to act where 
international law failed to stimulate any substantive action. That 
subnational agreement, embodied as a Memorandum of 
Understanding, was guided by important emerging norms of 
international law such as the need for transboundary ecosystem 
management, the critical importance of impact assessment, and 
precautionary approaches, as well as founded on the principle of 
subsidiarity. In Part VI we highlight the important soft law norms that 
influenced the subnational agreement, and conclude by showing how 
 
7 The Convention of 1818 between the United States and Great Britain first established 
the 49th parallel as the boundary between Canada and the United States. Rush-Bagot Pact, 
1817 and Convention of 1818, U.S. DEP’T ST.: OFF. HISTORIAN, http://history.state 
.gov/milestones/1801-1829/rush-bagot (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). At this time, the United 
States had recently acquired a vast swath of lands through the Louisiana Purchase and 
from Great Britain, which still claimed Canada as its own. This boundary was reaffirmed 
in the Oregon Treaty of 1848 between the same parties. The Oregon Territory, 1846, U.S. 
DEP’T ST.: OFF. HISTORIAN, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/oregon             
-territory (last visited Jan. 4, 2014). The 49th parallel boundary stretches from Manitoba 
and Minnesota all the way to the West Coast. 
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British Columbia and Montana created a “win-win” scenario at the 
local level by creating reciprocal promises that provided local 
benefits. 
I 
SETTING THE STAGE 
A. The Biological Setting: A Rich and Diverse Ecosystem 
The Crown is among North America’s most ecologically rich and 
pristine ecosystems, resulting from its location at the convergence of 
a variety of ecosystems.8 As discussed below, the region’s biological 
richness is confounded by its economic bounty—coal, oil and gas, 
timber, and now recreation. The push for development of economic 
resources conflicts with ecosystem protection and governance. 
Strategically situated at the transition zone between continental and 
pacific maritime climates, the Crown sends its waters to the Pacific, 
Atlantic, and Arctic Oceans and contains environments ranging from 
prairie to alpine. It hosts high levels of biodiversity, including 1,200 
species of vascular plants, more than 300 bird species, 65 species of 
native mammals, and a number of rare and endemic species.9 In a 
distance of less than 100 kilometers, one can experience old-growth 
cedar forests, alpine tundra and glaciers, and semi-arid sagebrush 
steppe.10 No other place in North America rivals the Crown’s 
diversity. 
Because of its diversity, the Crown hosts the greatest large 
mammal assemblage in North America, including sixteen carnivore 
 
8 According to UNESCO’s Statement of Significance, the Crown “occupies a pivotal 
position in the Western Cordillera of North America resulting in the evolution of plant 
communities and ecological complexes that occur nowhere else in the world.” Waterton 
Glacier International Peace Park, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org /en/list/354 (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2014) [hereinafter UNESCO Description]. Because the Crown lies at the 
triple divide of the Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic Oceans, and has nearly 8000 feet of 
vertical relief, an incredible array of ecosystems are found in a relatively confined area. Id. 
9 See generally KATHERINE DEUEL ET AL., CROWN OF THE CONTINENT 
CONSERVATION INITIATIVE, A Climate-Impacts Assessment of the Crown of the Continent 
(2010), available at http://cpaws-southernalberta.org/upload/Crown_Impacts_Assess 
_FINAL.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
10 See UNESCO Description, supra note 8. One of the ironies of Glacier National Park 
is that its famous glaciers are rapidly disappearing and will likely be gone by mid-21st 
century. Of the roughly 150 glaciers in the park in 1850, more than two-thirds were gone 
by 1980. Myrna H.P. Hall & Daniel B. Fagre, Modeled Climate-Induced Glacier Change 
in Glacier National Park, 1850-2100, 53 BIOSCIENCE 131, 131 (2003), available at 
http://www.nrmsc.usgs.gov/files/norock/products/GCC/Bioscience_Hall_03.pdf. 
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and six ungulate species.11 Capstone species such as grizzly bears, 
wolves, wolverines, and lynx reside in this setting, creating a haven 
for wildlife lovers.12 The Crown is especially important for grizzly 
bears because it constitutes part of the Northern Continental Divide 
Ecosystem population—the most robust population of grizzly bears 
remaining in the lower forty-eight states and the only population with 
a strong link to Canadian grizzlies.13 
The ecological richness of this ecosystem has been the impetus 
behind conservation efforts on both sides of the international border, 
at the national, subnational, and local levels. As discussed in the 
following section, these well-intended efforts are hampered by the 
complex system of public land management that has emerged over the 
last century. 
B. The Economic Riches of the Crown 
Economic pressures to develop the natural resources of the Crown 
come from two sources: commodity resources and 
amenity/recreational resources. The Crown has significant commodity 
resources, such as vast stands of merchantable timber; coal, oil, and 
conventional coal bed methane natural gas; and hard rock minerals 
including gold and copper. Full utilization of these resources conflicts 
with the Crown’s other natural resources: amenity values such as 
clean air and water, pristine natural beauty, and abundant outdoor 
 
11 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
art 4, opened for signature Nov. 16, 1972, 15 U.N.T.S. 511 (entered into force Dec. 17, 
1975). 
12 In the United States, grizzly bears and lynx are protected under the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA). Information about the history of grizzly and lynx listing and current 
information about the species can be found at the U.S. Fish and Wildlife website. Grizzly 
Bear (Ursus Arctos Horribilis), U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE (Nov. 22, 2013), 
http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=A001 (grizzly 
bears); Canada Lynx (Lynx Canadensis), UNITED STATES FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, 
http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=A073 (last 
modified Jan. 22, 2014) (lynx). But wolverines, which have been determined to be 
warranted for protection, are precluded because of a listing backlog. Environmental 
Conservation Online System, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, http://ecos.fws.gov 
/tess_public/pub/listedAnimals.jsp (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). Finally, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service has proposed removing the gray wolf from the ESA’s protective mandate. 
Elizabeth Shogren, After Major Comeback, is the Gray Wolf Still Endangered?, NPR 
(Dec. 27, 2013, 3:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/12/27/257654599/after-major-come 
back-is-the-gray-wolf-still-endangered. 
13 Katherine C. Kendall, Northern Divide Grizzly Bear Project 2002-2008, USGS, 
http://www.nrmsc.usgs.gov/research/NCDEbeardna.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
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recreation. These amenities attract millions of tourists annually in 
both the United States and Canada14 and thousands of new residents 
who want these values preserved. Burgeoning population growth and 
ever-expanding recreational opportunities add an additional layer to 
the resource/amenity conflict.15 
The Crown has large stores of carbon resources, increasingly 
attractive in an era of high energy prices. Historically, Native 
Americans used the oil that seeped to the surface long before 
Waterton was designated a national park. Early settlers on both sides 
of the border drilled for oil; Canada tapped wells as early as 1897 in 
the Waterton region, while drilling at Kintla Lake, now Glacier 
National Park, began in 1901.16 And today, the United States has 
long-producing commercial oil fields just east of Glacier.17 The value 
of oil and gas reserves along the Rocky Mountain Front, which 
extends south from Glacier and east of the Continental Divide, is 
significant, with natural gas reserves alone estimated in excess of two 
trillion cubic feet.18 The development of hydraulic fracturing 
technology has spurred renewed interest in natural gas development 
along the Front.19 
 
14 Glacier National Park alone receives about two million visitors annually. Glacier 
National Park Fact Sheet, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/glac/parknews/fact   
-sheet.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
15 Robert Keiter documents population growth on the U.S. side, noting that Flathead 
County grew at an extraordinary rate of twenty-six percent in the decade of 1990–2000 
alone. Sax & Keiter, supra note 5. Recreational pursuits can have serious environmental 
impacts, just like commodity extraction. Recreational impacts are an increasingly 
contentious subject of litigation in the United States from many different angles, including 
recent litigation over snowmobiling in the Crown. See, e.g., Swan View Coalition v. 
Barbouletos, 639 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D. Mont. 2009); Montanans for Multiple Use v. 
Barbouletos, 542 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2008). 
16 Glacier Nat’l History Ass’n, Man in Glacier: Explorers and Exploiters, NAT’L PARK 
SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/glac2/chap3a.htm (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2014). 
17 Compare Montana Counties, MONTANA.GOV, http://nris.mt.gov/gis/gisdatalib 
/downloads/county2.gif (last visited Jan. 7, 2014) (depicting Flathead and Glacier counties 
in the northwest corner of the state), with Montana/Dakotas Oil and Gas Producing Areas, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR: BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov 
/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/mt/blm_programs/energy/oil_and_gas.Par.36589.File.dat/ogpro 
ducingareas.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2014) (depicting gas and oil production to the east of 
Glacier County). 
18 Hal Herring, In Montana, the Next Artic Refuge Debate, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (Oct. 30, 2003), http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1030/p16s01-sten.html. 
19 Anschutz Exploration Corp. recently drilled fourteen new test wells on the Blackfeet 
Indian Reservation just east of Glacier National Park. Tristan Scott, Anschutz Exploration 
to Halt Oil, Gas Drilling on Blackfeet Reservation, MISSOULIAN (Mar. 20, 2013, 6:10 
AM), http://missoulian.com/news/local/anschutz-exploration-to-halt-oil-gas-drilling-on     
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On the northern side of the border, coal mining near Sparwood, 
British Columbia, provides high quality coking coal for export. The 
East Kootenai Coalfield, which underlies the headwaters of both the 
Elk and Flathead Rivers in British Columbia, contains high-quality 
bituminous coal useful for specialized metallurgical processes; 
current mining operations produce about twenty-six million tons 
annually for shipment overseas, primarily to Asia.20 Tech Coal Ltd. 
has five active mines that constitute the world’s second-largest source 
of seaborne metallurgical coal,21 and the Canadian coal industry touts 
the largest reserves and growth potential for British Columbia coal.22 
Indeed, more than 500 million tons of high quality metallurgical coal 
have been produced since 1898.23 Most of the coal is owned by the 
provincial government, which provides licenses to mining companies 
for exploration and production.24 
In addition to coal, some of Canada’s richest natural gas fields are 
in production in Alberta just north of the Crown. However, the natural 
gas resource on the Canadian side of the Crown is coal bed 
methane—methane gas trapped in coal seams. Coal bed methane 
(“CBM”) is already a significant source of natural gas in the United 
States and Alberta, as well as in northeastern British Columbia. No 
CBM-producing wells are in operation in the Crown; however, British 
Petroleum (BP) estimates that there are 250 billion cubic meters of 
gas underneath one 300 square kilometer BP leasehold.25 
The Crown holds one other significant commodity resource: 
timber. Valuable stands of timber span both sides of the border, 
especially west of the Continental Divide. For example, in the 1990s, 
 
-blackfeet-reservation/article_62382910-910c-11e2-85d1-0019bb2963f4.html. The drilling 
was controversial, and the company recently suspended further new development, though 
it operates several producing wells on the reservation. Id. 
20 MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND MINES & MINISTRY OF FORESTS, LANDS AND NATURAL 
RES. OPERATIONS, BRITISH COLUMBIA COAL INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 2011, at 3 (2012), 
available at http://www.mining.bc.ca/sites/default/files /resources/icoal2012-2_1.pdf. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 East Kootenay Coalfield, B.C. GEOLOGICAL SURV., http://webmap.em.gov.bc.ca 
/mapplace/Coal/kootenay.cfm?map=Kootenay (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). The British 
Columbia government provides extensive data about these coalfields. It also notes that the 
coal seams contain up to six trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas. Id. 
24 Energy Policy in Canada: History of Coal in Canada, WIKIPEDIA, http://en 
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_policy_of_Canada#Coal (last modified Jan. 12, 2014). 
25 BP Explores B.C. Coal Methane Reserves, CBCNEWS (July 14, 2010, 12:59 PM ET), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2010/07/14/cp-coal-bed-methane-bc.html. 
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the Flathead National Forest determined that it could sustainably 
harvest up to 100 million board feet per year.26 And Crown lands in 
Canada west of Waterton are also under intensive timber management 
as part of the Cranbrook Timber Supply Area, making it a significant 
component of the local economy.27 
The considerable economic value of these commodities must be 
weighed against the significant contributions of recreational and 
amenity values of the area. Glacier National Park alone receives about 
two million visitors per year, generating an estimated one billion 
dollars to the local economy.28 Beyond the scenic grandeur, tourists 
are attracted to hiking and wildlife-watching opportunities in the 
national parks while the surrounding lands have world-class fishing, 
hunting, downhill and cross-country skiing, biking, backpacking, and 
mountaineering.29 Two world-class destination ski and summer 
resorts at Fernie and Whitefish have expanded steadily over the past 
three decades. Not counting the value of the ecological services 
provided by this largely intact ecosystem, the tourism and recreation 
industries spawned by the region’s amenity values contribute 
hundreds of millions of dollars to state and provincial coffers.30 
 
26 The 100 million board feet objective was never realized, as it was overturned in 
litigation because of inadequately-considered impacts to grizzly bears. Resources Ltd., Inc. 
v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (9th Cir. 1993). In response to continued litigation 
over timber harvest impacts on bears and other wildlife, the Flathead eventually lowered 
its allowable sale quantity to fifty-four million board feet. FLATHEAD NAT’L FOREST, U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST PLAN AMENDMENT #19: ALLOWABLE SALE QUANTITY AND 
OBJECTIVES AND STANDARDS FOR GRIZZLY BEAR HABITAT MANAGEMENT 26 (1995). 
27 See, e.g., FORSITE CONSULTANTS LTD., CRANBROOK TIMBER SUPPLY AREA TIMBER 
SUPPLY REVIEW #3: ANALYSIS REPORT VERSION 3.0 (2004), available at http://www 
.for.gov.bc.ca/hts/tsa/tsa05/tsr3/05ts04ar_v3.pdf. The analysis report details harvest quotas 
for the area, which extends west beyond the Crown. The report shows that forestry 
accounts for 13.0% of the area’s employment income while mining accounts for 21.1% of 
income, demonstrating the importance of resource extraction to the economy. Id. at 63 
tbl.10. 
28 Nicholas K. Geranios, Uncertain Future for Glacier, NBC NEWS.COM (May 17, 
2010, 10:50:29 AM ET), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/37189235/ns/travel-active_travel/t 
/uncertain-future-glacier/#.UsT2B3nubBA. 
29 Skiing, for example, is booming in the Crown. The ski resort at Fernie has 
mushroomed in size and number of skiing visitors. Its legendary powder garners the resort 
top rankings among North American ski resorts. See FERNIE STANFORD RESORT, 
http://www.ferniestanfordresort.com/in-fernie-bc (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). The Whitefish 
Mountain Resort (formerly The Big Mountain) had another record season in 2011–12. 
Matt Baldwin, Resort Posts Record Numbers Despite December Drought, WHITEFISH 
PILOT (Apr. 18, 2012, 10:09 AM), http://www.whitefishpilot.com/hungryhorsenews 
/article_6379a40b-ec2a-5de4-9217-0bb3c215b0ae.html. 
30 For example, a study by the National Parks Service found that in 2010 Glacier 
National Park alone contributed over $110 million to the local economy. Jim Mann, Park 
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Towns on both sides of the border—Fernie in British Columbia, and 
Kalispell and Whitefish in Montana—have boomed from eco-tourism 
in the last three decades.31 
The economic wealth brought through resource extraction and 
development in the Crown inevitably leads to environmental 
degradation. Coal mining causes a host of adverse impacts including 
land alteration, significant water pollution, and air quality issues.32 
Logging and its requisite road infrastructure can disturb wildlife 
habitat, increase stream sedimentation, and alter undisturbed 
ecosystems.33 Amenity-based recreation has impacts too. For 
example, modern ski resorts and second-home communities consume 
tens of thousands of acres of wild lands and hordes of tourists disrupt 
wildlife.34 If unchecked, love of the Crown’s beauty and wildlife 
through housing and recreation development could further its demise 
every bit as much as coal mining and logging. In tandem, these 
pressures pose a threat to the very benefits that distinguish the Crown. 
At the same time, these amenity resources can drive efforts to protect 
the area from conventional resource development. 
  
 
Visitors Spend $110 Million in 2010, DailyInterLake.com (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www 
.dailyinterlake.com/news/local_montana/article_2ca37dbe-6358-11e1-a8c6-0019bb2963 
f4.html. 
31 For example, Fernie, British Columbia, has morphed from a quaint mining and 
logging town to an international year-round resort featuring skiing, mountain biking, fly-
fishing, and other adventure-based recreation activities, About Fernie: Established in 
1898, FERNIE BRITISH COLUMBIA, http://tourismfernie.com/about (last visited Jan 22, 
2014). 
32 The environmental impacts of coal mining are well documented on both sides of the 
border. Coal mining in the Crown has already caused significant water pollution. A 2003 
study of water quality in the Elk River found “alarming” levels of selenium, which can be 
toxic to native fish. Tristan Scott, UM Research: Mining Pollutants Entering Elk River 
Drainage in Southeast B.C., MISSOULIAN (Mar. 24, 2013, 8:15 AM), http://missoulian 
.com/news/state-and-regional/um-research-mining-pollutants-entering-elk-river-drainage   
-in-southeast/article_85fd4768-9436-11e2-8848-0019bb2963f4.html. 
33 See, e.g., AYESHA ERCELAWN, END OF THE ROAD: THE ADVERSE ECOLOGICAL 
IMPACTS OF ROADS AND LOGGING: A COMPILATION OF INDEPENDENTLY REVIEWED 
RESEARCH (1999), available at http://www.nrdc.org/land/forests/roads/eotrinx.asp. 
34 The National Ski Area Association, in recognition of the significant impacts caused 
by ski areas, as well as their dependence on a “natural” environment to attract customers, 
instituted a Sustainable Slopes environmental charter in 2000 to encourage more 
environmentally sensitive practices at ski areas. See generally NAT’L SKI AREA ASS’N, 
SUSTAINABLE SLOPES: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHARTER FOR SKI AREAS (2005), available 
at http://www.nsaa.org/media/20665/charter.pdf. 
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C. The Geo-Political Setting–a Patchwork of Conflicting Land 
Management Mandates 
1. The National Parks 
The Crown centers on the Glacier and Waterton National Parks—
two of the oldest national parks in the United States and Canada. 
Glacier National Park was established in 1910 as the United States’ 
tenth national park.35 The federal National Park Service, under the 
U.S. Department of the Interior, manages the land under the 
protective mandate of the Organic Park Service Act of 1916.36 In the 
southwestern corner of Alberta, Waterton Lakes National Park 
stretches 505 square kilometers northeast from the U.S. border at 
Glacier. It was dedicated in 1895 as Canada’s fourth national park and 
is managed under the Canadian National Parks Act of 1930, which 
also embodies a protective mandate similar to that of U.S. national 
parks.37 These parks share a common boundary and were jointly 
declared an International Peace Park in 1932,38 a designation with no 
legal mandate,39 but one that carries considerable political and moral 
weight on both sides of the border. 
 
35 A Brief History of Glacier, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/glac/history 
culture/historical-overview.htm (last modified Dec. 24, 2013). 
36 Glacier National Park is governed by the Organic Act of 1916, which requires that 
the lands be managed “to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the 
wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such 
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” Organic 
Park Service Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). The inherent contradiction in providing 
for human enjoyment and protecting natural integrity has been oft litigated in the United 
States, with courts generally favoring preservation. 
37 Canada National Parks Act, S.C. 2000, c. 32 (Can.). The basic mandate of the Act is 
contained in Section 4 and is similar to the U.S. Organic Act in that it provides for both 
public enjoyment and long-term protection. “The national parks of Canada are hereby 
dedicated to the people of Canada for their benefit, education and enjoyment, subject to 
this Act and the regulations, and the parks shall be maintained and made use of so as to 
leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” Id. § 4. 
38 The symbolic union of the parks was achieved through the efforts of Rotary 
International members from Montana and Alberta. In 1932 the national governments of 
both Canada and the Untied States passed legislation declaring the area an International 
Peace Park, the first such designation in North America and perhaps the world. Waterton-
Glacier International Peace Park, PARKS CAN., http://www.pc.gc.ca/pn-np/ab/waterton 
/natcul/inter.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). A small Peace Park was dedicated thirty years 
earlier along the Swedish-Norway border at Morlkulien, but such a designation does not 
appear to have an ecological basis and did not connect two existing reserves and consists 
of a small monument. Jan S. Krogh’s Geosite: Morokulien, MOROKULIAN, http://geosite 
.jankrogh.com/borders/morokulien (last updated May 4, 2012). 
39 Prime Minister R.B. Bennett, upon passing the legislation to designate the Peace 
Park in Canada in 1932, stated that the two parks are “to be known as one international 
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The Crown has been the subject of two additional international 
designations under programs developed by the United Nations 
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).40 First 
the parks were dedicated as a World Biosphere Reserve in 1976 
(Glacier) and 1979 (Waterton), formally including the area in the 
United Nations Biosphere Reserve Program. Biosphere reserves are 
area designations under UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere Program, 
which recognizes areas “where new and optimal practices to manage 
nature and human activities are tested and demonstrated.”41 While 
there are now approximately 621 such designations in 117 countries, 
only 12 of them span international borders.42 
In December 1995, the two parks were also jointly designated as a 
UNESCO World Heritage Site.43 World Heritage Sites differ from 
biosphere reserves in that they include both natural and human-
created sites, and are governed under the auspices of the 1972 World 
Heritage Convention. World Heritage Sites are sites of cultural, 
historical and natural importance. Sites can include cities (e.g., 
Venice, Italy), archeological areas (the Mayan ruins at Copan) and 
natural areas (Yosemite and Yellowstone National Parks).44 
These designations elevate the stature of the Crown as an 
internationally important ecological resource. While largely symbolic, 
and lacking in an enforceable legal mandate, these designations 
provide enough soft law to provide important background principles 
to affect the outcome of the transboundary resource disputes studied 
below. 
 
peace park for the purpose of indicating that a boundary line passes through the park and 
divides two great countries and two great peoples who have lived in peace for many years 
and who, we all hope, will continue ever to live in terms of amity, goodwill and peace.” 
Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park, PARKS CAN., http://www.pc.gc.ca/pn-np 
/ab/waterton/natcul/inter.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). The designation, while purely 
symbolic, embodies a powerful statement about the relationship between peaceful 
coexistence and transboundary ecological preservation. 
40 See generally UNESCO Description, supra note 8. 
41 Biosphere Reserves–Learning Sites for Sustainable Development, UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/ecological-sciences 
/biosphere-reserves (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
42 Id. 
43 See Waterton Glacier International Peace Park, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en 
/list/354 (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
44 See generally World Heritage List, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/ (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
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2. Land Management Below the 49th Parallel 
Federal statutory environmental law in the United States also offers 
protection for federal lands below the 49th Parallel in the Crown. The 
Flathead and Lewis and Clark National Forests manage over 2.3 
million acres of federal public lands under a “multiple-use” mandate 
and are susceptible to political pressures for resource extraction.45 
Some of these national forest lands are protected under the 1964 
Wilderness Act, perhaps the most protective designation for public 
lands in the United States.46 Logging, coal mining, oil and gas 
extraction, and road construction are generally prohibited under the 
Wilderness Act.47 However, much of the non-wilderness portions of 
these national forests were originally designated for natural resource 
development under Forest Service land management plans.48 In 
addition, flowing along the western flank of Glacier is the North Fork 
of the Flathead River, protected as a wild river under the federal Wild 
and Scenic Rivers Act.49 
In addition to these federal land and water designations, the 
Blackfeet Indian Reservation encompasses 1.5 million acres along 
Glacier’s eastern border.50 The tribal government, in conjunction with 
 
45 The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act is a nebulous statute requiring management of 
national forests for grazing, logging, recreation, fish and wildlife and wilderness. Multiple-
Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528–31 (2000)). The National Forest Management Act requires 
protection of soils, watersheds and species diversity, but is still very much a utilitarian 
mandate for national forests. National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–14 (2000)). 
46 The Wilderness Act allows Congress to set aside areas that are “area[s] where the 
earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man.” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2012). 
With very limited exceptions, once Congress designates an area of federal land as 
Wilderness, permanent structures, resource development roads and any type of 
mechanized or motorized vehicles are prohibited. Id. § 1131(b), (c). About forty-five 
percent of the Flathead National Forest has been designated as Wilderness, including the 
famed Bob Marshall Wilderness, one of the first in the United States. 
47 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). While there are some exceptions to these prohibitions, large 
scale coal, oil and gas extraction and commercial logging are prohibited in areas 
designated as Wilderness under the Act. 
48 See Sax & Keiter, supra note 5, at 246–47, 256. 
49 The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1968). The Act is a federal law 
that protects free-flowing rivers under a three-tier classification system. See id. “Wild 
rivers” are the most protected classification. See id. Wild rivers are protected from dams, 
mining, and large-scale commercial development. See id. However, the classification 
generally includes only a narrow corridor, less than a mile wide, along the wild river. See 
id. 
50 Welcome to Blackfeet Country!, BLACKFEET COUNTRY, http://www.blackfeet 
country.com/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). 
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the U.S. Department of the Interior, manages the natural resources 
found here. While resource management in Indian Country is 
complex and beyond the scope of this Article, the relevant factor here 
is the addition of yet another sovereign into the management fray.51 
Adding to the complicated management structure for lands within 
the Crown ecosystem are Montana school-trust lands, managed by the 
Montana state government under a revenue-for-schools mandate.52 
Montana state lands include both the Swan and Stillwater State 
Forests, which adjoin the Flathead National Forest but which the state 
manages foremost to produce revenue for Montana public schools. 
Resource extraction, not preservation, is the dominant mandate for 
Montana state lands. 
The patchwork of federal, state, tribal, and county jurisdictions 
make ecosystem-based resource planning and protection a daunting 
task in the United States; each jurisdiction has a separate management 
plan, sometimes with conflicting goals and standards. While there are 
efforts to coordinate, different government agencies are subject to 
wide-ranging political influences and bureaucratic agendas.53 To date, 
a shared, binding common vision for managing the Crown has been 
elusive. Different legal mandates and political agendas for the various 
 
51 Tribal reservations are created by treaty between two sovereign governments. The 
relationship between tribal governance and the role of the federal government is legally 
complex. However, resource development is not constrained as it may be on other federal 
lands. The Blackfeet, for example leased over 600,000 acres of their reservation for oil and 
gas exploration in 2011, despite concerns over ecosystem impacts. Howard Pankratz, 
Anschutz Oil Firm Ends Exploration on Blackfeet Reservation in Montana, DENVER POST 
(Mar. 20, 2013, 9:29:28 AM MDT), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_2283 
0823/anschutz-oil-firm-ends-exploration-blackfeet-reservation-montana. The lessee, 
Anschutz Exploration Co., relinquished the leases in 2013 after test well results did not 
yield opportunities for commercial extraction. Id. 
52 Montana currently manages about 5.1 million acres of surface lands and about 6.1 
million acres of mineral estate. Overview of School Trust Lands, MONTANA.GOV, 
http://dnrc.mt.gov/Trust/AboutUs/Overview.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). School trust 
lands were federal lands granted to the newly created State of Montana by the federal 
government as part of the Enabling Act of 1889 and are managed to provide long-term 
income to support public education. Id. 
53 For example, the conservative local government in Flathead County has promoted 
resource development and subdivision, including approving a new gravel pit mine 
practically on the banks of the North Fork, across the river from Glacier. Park officials 
vehemently objected to Flathead County’s actions, and local residents tried to defend what 
they thought was a protective land use plan in court after the mining company sued to 
obtain a permit, all to no avail. See Spoklie & Hoover v. Flathead Cnty., Mont. Eleventh 
Judicial Dist., Flathead Cnty., DV-06-152A; see also Gravel Pit Near Glacier National 
Park May Grow, FLATHEAD BEACON (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.flat 
headbeacon.com/articles/article/gravel_pit_near_glacier_national_park_may_grow/9249. 
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bureaucracies in charge of land management stymy more holistic 
approaches.54 
3. Canadian Land Management 
Canada’s land management system and environmental laws are 
less complex than those in the United States. While Waterton 
National Park is part of a large spine of the Canadian Continental 
Divide protected by a spectacular array of provincial and national 
parks running north to Jasper Townsite, the park itself is quite 
small.55 It is governed by the Canadian National Parks Act, 
legislation akin to the U.S. National Parks Organic Act.56 Beyond 
Waterton, two provincial governments, Alberta and British Columbia, 
retain large swaths of Crown lands that can be made available for 
resource extraction. Immediately west of Waterton, the recently 
created Akamina-Kishinena Provincial Park protects additional lands 
in British Columbia adjacent to Waterton. Farther west are large 
sections of provincial Crown lands, which are subject to licenses for 
timber harvesting and mining with relatively little protection for the 
environment. In addition, the Canadian national government owns 
coal reserves in this area that are subject to disposition by the federal 
government.57 
The complicated mix of international, national, state, provincial, 
tribal, and municipal governments creates a difficult legal framework 
for managing the Crown as an ecosystem and addressing 
transboundary issues. Moreover, each of the government stakeholders 
is subject to different and ever-changing political agendas, some pro-
extraction and others pro-preservation. For example, Montana has 
been governed by relatively liberal, and sometimes strongly pro-
 
54 The patchwork quilt of federal, state, tribal, and local jurisdictions is by no means 
unique to the Glacier Park area. The ad hoc nature of land disposition and retention 
schemes that persisted throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has left vast 
swaths of the American West in mixed ownership patterns, creating widely differing 
management schemes on adjacent lands. 
55 The park consists of roughly 505 square kilometers. Waterton Lakes National Park: 
A Quick Guide, PARKS CAN., http://www.pc.gc.ca/eng/pn-np/ab/waterton/visit/visit6.aspx 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
56 Canada National Parks Act, S.C. 2000, c. 32 (Can.). 
57 See Rob Chaney, Coal Mining Again a Concern in Canadian Flathead, MISSOULIAN 
(Nov. 28, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://missoulian.com/news/local/coal-mining-again-a-concern 
-in-canadian-flathead/article_101be164-390d-11e2-bcb6-001a4bcf887a.html. The 
Canadian federal government also owns coal reserves in the Crown that are not subject to 
the authority of the British Columbia government. A recent article chronicled the impact 
that development of these federal lands could have for the entire Crown. Id. 
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environment, democratic governors for the past twelve years,58 while 
the Montana Legislature is Republican-controlled and decidedly anti-
conservation.59 The Blackfeet Nation has strong factions both 
opposed to and in favor of resource development.60 Canadian 
provincial politics shift as well. British Columbia was decidedly pro-
development in the 1980s. In 1991, a more left-of-center party came 
into power, only to lose power to the more conservative Liberal Party 
in 2001.61 The shift in British Columbia politics continues today as 
citizens witnessed the rapid demise of Premier Gordon Campbell and 
the election of pro-development Premier Christy Clark in 2011. 
II 
THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE TO PROTECT THE CROWN 
In an ideal world, the Crown would be managed by a legally 
enforceable management plan agreed upon by all the stakeholders. 
The plan would encompass the entire Crown ecosystem on both sides 
of the border and provide for sustainable economic development 
while preserving the ecological richness of the area. The present 
reality is far different from such an ideal. 
To start with, the legal landscape is complex. As discussed below, 
international treaties, conventions, and norms of international law 
certainly affect, but do not control, the management of the Crown. 
These international legal mechanisms are the primary focus of this 
paper. At the national level, the United States has particularly strong 
federal laws to protect endangered species and water quality, and to 
manage forests. However, those laws cannot easily reach across the 
 
58 Democrat Brian Schweitzer, who became a key player in the North Fork of the 
Flathead dispute, served from 2004–2012. Steve Bullock was elected in 2012 and will 
serve at least until 2016. Both are generally considered to be pro-conservation and enjoy 
broad support in the environmental community. 
59 For example, the Legislature amended the Montana Environmental Policy Act in 
2003, 2007, 2009, and 2011, and each change weakened the statute. Changes included 
creating a higher burden of proof for plaintiffs and the relief a court can provide, MONT. 
CODE. ANN. § 75-1-201(6)(a)–(c) (2013), and eliminating the ability of NGOs to collect 
attorney fees. Id. § 75-1-201(6)(f). 
60 Tristan Scott, Oil, Gas Dilemma for Blackfeet Tribe: Revenue Versus Environment, 
MISSOULIAN (Aug. 7, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://missoulian.com/news/local/article_51a5d 
936-c0ab-11e0-a26e-001cc4c002e0.html. 
61 Nadia Souchek, Trading Off the Benefits and Burdens: Coal Development in the 
Transboundary Flathead Valley River Valley (Spring 2012) (unpublished M.S. thesis, 
University of Montana) (on file with authors) (providing extensive background on the 
politics of resource development in the Flathead on both sides of the border). 
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border. Meanwhile, Canada’s federal environmental laws are far less 
stringent. And on both sides of the border, subnational actors have 
considerable discretion to address issues that arise in the context of 
development and conservation, as we shall see below. 
A. Hard and Soft Law in International Environmental Law 
A brief digression into some background principles of international 
environmental law will help frame the transboundary issue in the 
Crown. Both hard law (legally binding treaties and conventions) and 
soft law (norms or customs, nonbinding agreements) are relevant to 
understanding the North Fork dispute. While hard law in the form of 
an international treaty was available to address the transboundary 
pollution issue in the Flathead, successful environmental protection 
was ultimately achieved through soft law in the form of a nonbinding 
memorandum of understanding predicated on nonbinding emerging 
norms. 
We consider two related aspects of soft law in the area of 
transboundary pollution. Mutual policy statements, such as 
agreements to cooperate, may have the appearance of a binding hard 
law treaty, but are ultimately not legally enforceable. One scholar 
finds that the vast majority of international environmental treaties and 
conventions fit into this realm of soft law.62 A second aspect of soft 
law buffets the precatory nature of these agreements: the adoption of 
environmental law principles in the international context, which 
thereby establishes and expands international environmental law—
transforming what may begin as a principle into a norm or custom. 
While these norms cannot be enforced in the traditional sense of 
imposing liability—through a binding judicial decision holding a 
party accountable—they nonetheless operate as important background 
principles that can lead to action. 
Scholars and practitioners have addressed the dichotomy between 
hard and soft law in the international context for many years. Much of 
the literature in this field focuses on one mechanism as a spur to the 
other. For instance, soft law mechanisms that allow the initial 
statement of principles later become binding international 
agreements; or hard law mechanisms that utilize soft law expand the 
 
62 Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 
933 (1997) (“And with isolated exceptions, the transboundary treaties that do exist are 
largely devoted to encouraging information-sharing and consultation, rather than 
establishing liability regimes or prescribing substantive limitations on polluting activity.”). 
TUHOLSKI (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  12:24 PM 
2014] Solving Transboundary Pollution Disputes Locally: 667 
Success in the Crown of the Continent 
impact of a binding agreement.63 And while criticism has been levied 
at soft law for the nonbinding nature of these norms or agreements, 
soft law has a role of growing importance for international 
environmental law. For instance, in addressing the varied interaction 
of international agreements, one scholar, Pierre-Marie Dupuy, noted 
that 
 [a]lbeit indirect, the legal effect of “soft” law is nevertheless 
real. “Soft” law is not merely a new term for an old (customary) 
process; it is both a sign and product of the permanent state of 
multilateral cooperation and competition among the heterogeneous 
members of the contemporary world community. 
 The existence of “soft” law compels us to re-evaluate the general 
international law-making process and, in doing so, illuminates the 
difficulty of explaining this phenomenon by referring solely to the 
classical theory of formal sources of public international law.64 
Of note in Dupuy’s characterization of soft law is the parenthetical 
aside to customary law, thereby subtly referencing the emergence of 
norms of international law through the substantiation of customs. This 
view of soft law evokes the classical role of nonbinding agreements, 
or the hortatory language of early agreements, whereby early 
principles could transition to norms of international law through wide 
recognition and like implementation. 
But turning to the descriptors themselves, scholars have addressed 
the unique implementation of hard and soft law—that is, the effects of 
international agreements have been delineated into those that require 
strict action (or no action) versus those agreements that allow 
discretion on the part of the signatory. One simple way to distinguish 
the two concepts is through a comparison of binding and nonbinding 
agreements.65 In terms of hard law, in the international law context 
these agreements are generally seen as “legally binding obligations 
that are precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the 
issuance of detailed regulations) and that delegate authority for 
 
63 Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, 
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 721 
(2010). 
64 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 420, 435 (1991). Dupuy classifies this soft law concept as “a trouble 
maker because it is either not yet or not only law.” Id. at 420. This characterization is 
especially appropriate in the current context, where an international agreement binds the 
parties while simultaneously providing the parties the framework to create the actual legal 
mechanisms independent of the agreement that would fulfill each party’s obligation. 
65 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 63, at 713. 
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interpreting and implementing the law.”66 On the other hand, the 
concept of soft law contains more amorphous mechanisms—
amorphous in the varied and nonbinding nature of the agreements. 
For instance, a soft law agreement can simply be precatory without 
any binding language.67 Or, the agreement can simply be so vague 
that complete discretion is left with the parties to implement as they 
see fit.68 
Of course, while the scholars Shaffer and Pollack recognize the 
traditional definitions afforded these categories, they also recognize 
the gray area existing in the reality of implementation. They set a 
sliding continuum upon which an outside observer may assess any 
agreement to determine its distinct binding nature.69 That is not to say 
that hard law agreements occur as more substantial documents or 
more practical agreements in the international context. Indeed, the 
benefits of both soft and hard law are well documented.70 Picturing a 
state action upon this continuum, rather than one of two categories of 
action, allows a person to recognize influences affecting the 
agreement and the individuality of situations requiring such 
agreements. Additionally, and most importantly, is the intent of 
parties in entering into any agreement. If the purpose, as taken from 
surrounding evidence, demonstrates an intention to be bound, then 
even a soft law agreement can provide an impetus for achieving 
notable accomplishments and requiring specific action. 
Especially in the context of international environmental law, the 
ability to address transboundary issues jointly while constructing 
individualized solutions to a shared problem requires unique and 
novel avenues. 
B. International Treaties Available to Protect the Crown 
International law offers three avenues for addressing transboundary 
pollution. Specific treaties relevant to U.S.-Canadian international 
 
66 Id. at 714–15 (internal quotations omitted). 
67 Id. at 715. 
68 Id. Shaffer and Pollack also point out that the omission to delegate any authority to a 
party outside the agreement turns the law into soft law, “because there is no third party 
providing a ‘focal point’ around which parties can reassess their positions.” Id. 
69 Id. at 716. 
70 See, e.g., Martin Köppel, The Effectiveness of Soft Law: First Insights from 
Comparing Legally Binding Agreements with Flexible Action Programs, 21 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 821 (2009). 
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resource disputes include the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909;71 the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),72 with its 
subcomponent the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation (NAAEC);73 and the conventions pertinent to the 
Crown’s partial designation as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.74 
The first two constitute hard law, as they contain binding obligations 
with a mechanism for enforcement. The latter is decidedly soft law. 
Each is outlined below. 
1. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 
The most important international law governing water disputes 
between the United States and Canada is the Boundary Waters Treaty 
of 1909.75 Originally negotiated between the United States and Great 
Britain, the Treaty has specific, enforceable mechanisms and a long 
history of mutual respect on both sides of the border. This relic of the 
Progressive Era, a period when the concept of water as a public 
resource was more widely understood than it is today, retains vitality. 
The Treaty is designed to resolve conflicts over all transboundary 
waters along the nations’ 3,000-mile border76 and contains several 
substantive provisions. Further, the Treaty sets up the International 
Joint Commission (IJC), an adjudicatory body comprised of six 
commissioners, three appointed by each country,77 to resolve 
disputes. 
 
71 Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters 
Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Can., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 
[hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty], available at http://ijc.org/en_/BWT (courtesy of the 
International Joint Commission). 
72 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 
2057 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
73 NAFTA includes the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. Id. 
at Section 532, 19 U.S.C. § 3472, Dec. 8, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept., 107 Stat. 2164 
[hereinafter NAAEC], available at http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=1226&Site 
NodeID=567. 
74 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
supra note 11. 
75 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 71. The scope of transboundary waters is vast, 
and includes the entire Great Lakes, St. Lawrence River, the Columbia River, and a host of 
smaller streams and lakes, including of course the North Fork of the Flathead. 
76 Id. pmbl., 36 Stat. at 2448. 
77 As another author has explained: 
[T]he Treaty provides for referrals to the IJC for non-binding recommendations 
“whenever either the Government of the United States or the Government of the 
Dominion of Canada shall request.” The nations may also refer a dispute to the 
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Article III of the Treaty requires that decisions on proposed uses, 
obstructions, or diversions “affecting the natural level or flow” of the 
boundary waters or waters crossing the boundary must be approved 
by the IJC. Public works for navigation and commerce can continue 
but cannot “affect the flow and level of the boundary waters of the 
other” or “interfere with the ordinary use of such waters for domestic 
and sanitary purposes.”78 The Treaty further requires that “boundary 
waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted 
on either side to the injury of health or property on the other.”79 The 
Treaty also has mandatory provisions for IJC jurisdiction over 
activities that affect the flow of water across the borders. Article VIII 
extends mandatory IJC jurisdiction over “cases involving the use or 
obstruction or diversion of the waters.”80 Without the IJC’s approval, 
Article III prevents “uses or obstructions or diversions, whether 
temporary or permanent, of boundary waters on either side of the line, 
affecting the natural level or flow of boundary waters on the other 
side of the line.”81 Thus the Boundary Waters Treaty contains 
substantive hard law provisions. These provisions can be used to 
create IJC jurisdiction over water disputes involving both changes to 
water quality and quantity, and could potentially be invoked in the 
dispute over coal mining in the Crown. 
However, only the signatories to the Treaty—national 
sovereigns—may bring complaints to the IJC.82 Thus the Treaty is 
hard law, with a twist. Submission of pollution-related disputes to the 
IJC requires the approval of both sovereigns, no matter how serious 
the pollution. Furthermore, the Treaty lacks a citizen initiated petition 
process that would allow citizens or other subnational governmental 
bodies to seek IJC jurisdiction. These elements can leave enforcement 
of the Treaty to the whims of national politics. 
However, the Treaty is far from impotent. Implementation of the 
Boundary Waters Treaty has been imbued with a long history of 
 
IJC in which the bi-national body would have the “power to render a decision or 
finding upon any of the questions or matters so referred,” but this procedure 
requires the consent of both Parties. 
Shiloh Hernandez, Mountaintop Removal at the Crown of the Continent: International 
Law and Energy Development in the Transboundary Flathead River Basin, 32 VT. L. REV. 
547, 560 (2008) (citations omitted). 
78 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 71, art. III. 
79 Id. at art. IV. 
80 Id. at art. VIII. 
81 Id. at art. III. 
82 Id. at art. X. 
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recognizing public values in transboundary waters. For example, in 
1918, the nascent IJC prepared a formal report at the behest of both 
governments on the growing transboundary industrial water pollution 
problem, particularly in the Great Lakes. In its report, the IJC 
determined that Article IV’s prohibition on transboundary pollution 
included not only actual pollution, but also the “potential” of injury to 
health or property.83 Such an approach is precautionary, not remedial. 
The IJC further noted that “while private rights . . . may be overridden 
by the acquisition of a prescriptive right, public rights can not.”84 
Public rights in the eyes of the IJC included swimming, recreational 
boating, and fishing. Such a statement reflects the overarching 
recognition that transboundary waters are a common-pool resource, 
and that governments have an obligation to protect public uses. The 
report was harshly critical of the heavily polluted status of many 
transboundary waters, especially those in the Great Lakes. The 
recognition of public rights in clean water for a multitude of public 
purposes a century ago is an important foundation to understanding 
why the Treaty played an important role in the resolution of the 
Flathead dispute. 
The IJC has been involved in several transboundary water pollution 
disputes over the last century. Of note was the IJC’s initial 
involvement in the Trail Smelter dispute, a case involving noxious 
fumes from a Canadian smelter drifting south into the United States 
and damaging farm land near the international border. Both countries 
agreed to the IJC’s jurisdiction, which in 1931 led to an award of 
$350,000 in damages but no injunctive relief.85 The United States 
rejected the decision, and the matter was eventually settled via 
binding international arbitration.86 The Trail Smelter case is a 
landmark transboundary pollution case, widely discussed in scholarly 
 
83 International Joint Commission, Final Report of the International Joint Commission 
in the Matter of the Reference by the United States and the Dominion of Canada Relative 
to the Pollution of Boundary Waters, at 30, Doc. 4 (Sept. 10, 1918), available at http://bwt 
.ijc.org/docket_table/attachments/Docket%204/Docket%204%20Final%20Report.pdf. 
84 Id. at 31. In this Report, the IJC expressed strong concerns about the deleterious 
effects of transboundary pollution, and extolled the public virtues of the vast water 
resources shared by the two nations. 
85 INT’L JOINT COMM’N, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION IN THE 
TRAIL SMELTER REFERENCE 1–2 (1931), available at http://www.ijc.org/files/dockets 
/Docket%2025/Docket%2025%20IJC%20Report%201931-02-28.pdf. 
86 See Trail Smelter Arbitration, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards, Vol. III, 1905–81 (1941), available at legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982 
.pdf. 
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literature as the first important international environmental law case.87 
The decision established the principle of international environmental 
law that a sovereign has no right to cause transboundary pollution and 
can be held legally responsible for such pollution.88 Trail Smelter is 
an important prelude to the North Fork dispute both for the principles 
it established and the fact that the dispute occurred between, and was 
successfully resolved by the United States and Canada. However, the 
Trail Smelter case demonstrates the basic problem of the Boundary 
Waters Treaty. While the Treaty focused the parties on a solution, 
ultimate resolution required a more binding forum. As discussed 
below, the Treaty failed to provide a forum for complete resolution of 
the North Fork dispute, albeit for different reasons.89 
Nonetheless, the Boundary Waters Treaty remains an important 
source of international law between the United States and Canada. 
The IJC has been proactive in addressing transboundary watershed 
pollution, even as it lacked power to prevent it. In 1997 the 
Commission proposed an International Watersheds Initiative to 
encourage proactive cooperation and prevent transboundary 
pollution.90 A key premise of the Initiative is to establish local joint 
management boards on specific waterways that can make decisions 
without undue interference from national governments or even the 
IJC.91 Several watersheds, including the St. Croix, Red River, and 
Rainy River already have functioning boards that are addressing 
transboundary pollution and water flow issues on a local level. 
However, the North Fork of the Flathead does not yet have such a 
watershed board. And more recently, a petition has been submitted to 
 
87 Merrill, supra note 62, at 947 (“By far the most influential decision on transboundary 
pollution in international law is the Trail Smelter arbitration.”). 
88 Id. at 948–50. 
89 Professor Noah Hall characterizes Trail Smelter as resolution of an international 
issue in the “Westphalian tradition” of sovereign-to-sovereign negotiation. Noah D. Hall, 
The Evolving Role of Citizens in United States-Canadian International Environmental 
Law Compliance, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 131, 135 (2007). Professor Hall highlights a 
theme that proves prescient in the North Fork debate, namely the role of subnational 
entities in resolving environmental disputes. Id. 
90 INT’L JOINT COMM’N, THE INTERNATIONAL WATERSHED INITIATIVE: 
IMPLEMENTING A NEW PARADIGM FOR TRANSBOUNDARY BASINS (2009), available at 
http://www.ijc.org/files/publications/ID1627.pdf; see also INT’L JOINT COMM’N, THE IJC 
AND THE 21ST CENTURY 27–32 (1997). 
91 INT’L JOINT COMM’N, THE INTERNATIONAL WATERSHED INITIATIVE: 
IMPLEMENTING A NEW PARADIGM FOR TRANSBOUNDARY BASINS (2009), available at 
http://www.ijc.org/files/publications/ID1627.pdf. The IJC states that “the underlying 
premise is that water resource and environmental problems can be anticipated, prevented 
or resolved at the local level before developing into international issues.” Id. at 1. 
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the IJC to recognize the Great Lakes as international waters subject to 
the Public Trust Doctrine based on the recognition of this common 
law precautionary principle in both the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, in 
the Canadian legal systems.92 
In sum, the Boundary Waters Treaty is a strong hard law 
mechanism that addresses transboundary pollution. The IJC, under 
this treaty, has a century-long tradition of taking a proactive approach 
to water quality protection. It carries a strong commitment on both 
sides of the border that exceeds its actual adjudicative reach. 
Ultimately the jurisdiction of the IJC is subject to the whims of 
national politics. The Commission does not have power to resolve 
disputes brought by subnationals or even citizens affected by 
pollution. But while the Treaty did not direct the outcome of the 
mining dispute in the Canadian Flathead, its presence was important 
to the resolution of the dispute. 
2. NAFTA as a Means of Protecting the Crown 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a binding 
international treaty that bears on the present developmentconservation 
in the Crown. Part of NAFTA includes the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), which was 
included in the trade agreement to secure the commitment of Canada 
and Mexico to the NAAEC as a way to ease domestic fears over 
NAFTA.93 
The NAAEC promotes two relevant objectives: “the protection and 
improvement of the environment in the territories of the Parties for 
the well-being of present and future generations” and the promotion 
of “sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually 
supportive environmental and economic policies.”94 The NAAEC 
also established a Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
 
92 Keith Schneider, Water Law: Public Trust May be Fresh Approach to Protecting 
Great Lakes, CIRCLEOFBLUE.ORG (Jan. 17, 2012, 2:09 PM), http://www.circleofblue.org 
/waternews/2012/world/water-law-public-trust-may-be-fresh-approach-to-protecting-great 
-lakes/. 
93 Hernandez, supra note 77, at 551 (citing Tseming Yang, The Effectiveness of the 
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement’s Citizen Submission Process: A Case Study of 
Metales y Derivados, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 443, 460–62 (2005)). 
94 NAAEC, supra note 73, at art. 1(a)–(b). As this Article will describe later, the 
Memorandum of Understanding between Montana and British Columbia incorporated 
these concerns into its language, thereby balancing the preservation against energy 
development and job creation in the Flathead region. 
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(CEC),95 which handles submissions from both signatories96 and 
citizens97 alleging non-enforcement of environmental laws. While it 
would appear from its stated policies and organization that the 
NAAEC and CEC could be used to protect transboundary resources in 
the Crown, this has not been the case. 
As noted above, the NAAEC and CEC, unlike proceedings before 
the IJC, allow for complaints from affected citizens. However, the 
procedures under NAAEC do not provide a means for a precautionary 
approach to protection of transboundary resources threatened by 
pollution. The citizen submission procedure functions as a reactionary 
device and “requires that there first be an enforcement failure.”98 One 
commentator explained that, in the context of the North Fork debate, 
the consultation procedure is ineffective: 
[T]he consultation procedure would not likely be an effective 
preventative measure that interested parties from Montana could 
use. While any party to the Agreement may unilaterally invoke the 
consultation procedure, the consultation must be based on a 
“persistent pattern of failure” of another Party to enforce its 
environmental laws. This retrospective requirement of the 
consultation procedure would not be applicable to potential future 
environmental harm associated with coal mining in the Canadian 
Flathead.99 
Coal mines not yet built cannot constitute a “persistent pattern of 
failure” of enforcement. Furthermore, any violation on the part of 
British Columbia would mean that Montana (or interested citizens) 
would first have to petition—or at the minimum request—the U.S. 
federal government to lodge a complaint upon the state’s behalf.100 
The political problems are obvious: if the federal executive is 
dominated by one political party and Montana by the other, politics 
could easily thwart initiating NAAEC’s protective provisions. 
Moreover, CEC is not a sustainable planning body, and has no power 
to develop international environmental impact statements or provide 
guidance regarding potential transboundary conflicts before they 
occur.101 In sum, NAFTA, NAAEC, and the CEC fail to provide a 
 
95 Id. art. 8(1). 
96 Id. art. 22(1). 
97 Id. art. 14(1), (1)(f). 
98 Hernandez, supra note 77, at 556 (citing NAAEC, supra note 73, at art. 14(1)). 
99 Id. at 556 (citations omitted). 
100 Recall that NAAEC is an agreement between the nation state bodies, those 
signatories being the United States, Mexico, and Canada. NAAEC, supra note 73, at pmbl. 
101 See Hernandez, supra note 77, at 558. 
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meaningful or viable solution to the problem of threatened 
environmental impact.102 
3. UNESCO World Heritage Site Status 
The United Nations enacted the World Heritage Convention in 
1972 to allow the designation of World Heritage Sites.103 World 
Heritage Sites are deemed irreplaceable ecological and cultural sites 
of profound significance to all of humanity. Currently, 936 sites in 
153 member states have been so designated and span cultural, 
historical, and natural areas. However, designation does not provide 
substantive international law mechanisms to protect the site from 
further encroachment. The Convention most closely aligns with the 
soft law designation, as it lacks a means for enforcement; notably, 
management of World Heritage Sites resides with the state where they 
are located and that management is basically voluntary. On the other 
hand, Article XI, subsection 4 does allow parties to petition UNESCO 
to designate listed sites as endangered from environmental threats.104 
Despite the lack of substantive law underlying an UNESCO World 
Heritage Site designation, in the forty years since the Convention was 
adopted, “the World Heritage concept is so well understood that sites 
on the List are a magnet for international cooperation.”105 Indeed, the 
purpose of designating a place as a heritage site is to highlight the 
international importance of a specific location—an importance that 
extends beyond the site’s local renown. The Crown’s designation as a 
World Heritage Site was often lauded by parties involved in the 
development dispute over the Flathead. 
C. Customary International Law 
Apart from binding treaties, customary international law or norms 
can play an important role in addressing transboundary pollution. 
 
102 Of course, this inability is in the nature of the agreement, which focuses on the non-
enforcement of environmental laws. While the goals are preservation of a natural 
environment and sustainable development, the legal device operates in a reactionary 
manner: the focus is on violations, not protection or precautions. 
103 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
supra note 11. 
104 Id. at art. XI(4). 
105 The World Heritage Convention, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/convention 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
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Several soft law principles in the context of transboundary pollution 
are relevant to this case study. 
1. Host Country Liability for Transboundary Pollution 
The Trail Smelter decision, discussed above in the context of the 
Boundary Waters Treaty, has had a far-reaching influence in 
international environmental law. Considered the first major 
international law case, the decision is widely cited as establishing the 
principle that the host country is liable for the transboundary pollution 
caused by its residents.106 The arbitration panel articulated that 
principle in bold terms: “Canada is responsible in international law 
for the conduct of the Trail Smelter.”107 As Professor Merrill notes, 
whatever the precedential effect of the Trail Smelter decision may be, 
the decision is “extremely influential” in the development of many 
other international environmental accords.108 
The principle that the host country is liable for transboundary 
pollution emanating within its borders, part of the broader “polluter 
pays” principle, was carried forth in the two major declarations of 
international environmental law principles in the last half of the 
twentieth century, the Stockholm and Rio Declarations. Among the 
many principles articulated in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, 
Principle 21 provides for both a sovereign right to develop resources 
and a concomitant responsibility to prevent transboundary 
pollution.109 That dichotomy—the right to develop and the 
responsibility to prevent harm to other nations—remains an important 
principle in international environmental law. Twenty years later, the 
Rio Declaration affirmed the same principle.110 
 
106 Merrill, supra note 62, at 947. 
107 Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 86. 
108 Merrill, supra note 62, at 951. 
109 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5–16, 1972, 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, princ. 21 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration], available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=150
3. 
110 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration states: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
TUHOLSKI (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  12:24 PM 
2014] Solving Transboundary Pollution Disputes Locally: 677 
Success in the Crown of the Continent 
2. The Precautionary Principle and Intergenerational Equity 
The 1992 Rio Declaration elucidated two other important norms of 
international environmental law beyond Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration: the precautionary principle and 
intergenerational equity.111 The precautionary or prevention principle 
stands for the proposition “that no nation may undertake activities 
within its borders that will cause significant injury to another 
nation.”112 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration offers a qualified 
endorsement of the precautionary approach, stating that, “[i]n order to 
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied.”113 
While the precautionary principle can be difficult to define 
precisely,114 it is nonetheless important in the context of international 
environmental law.115 The precautionary principle is thoroughly 
embedded in European Union environmental law, and while not 
uniformly part of U.S. environmental law, it influences international 
environmental decisions in a myriad of ways.116 Unlike remedial 
 
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.  
Id. at princ. 2. 
111 See generally Jutta Brunnee, The Stockholm Declaration and the Structure and 
Process of International Environmental Law, in THE FUTURE OF OCEAN REGIME-
BUILDING: ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO DOUGLASS M. JOHNSTON 41 (Aldo Chircop, Ted L. 
McDorman & Susan J. Rolston eds., 2009). Professor Brunnee notes that the Rio 
Declaration advanced several other important norms, not directly applicable here, such as 
common but differentiated responsibilities. 
112 Hernandez, supra note 77, at 569. 
113 Rio Declaration, supra note 110, at princ. 15. 
114 Consider the principle counsel’s restraint in the face of scientific uncertainty 
regarding harm. However, what constitutes harm and what constitutes uncertainty are 
themselves widely debated in scientific circles. 
115 See Hernandez, supra note 77, at 570–72 (chronicling the cases and international 
documents explaining the import of the principle and where it is appropriate to apply the 
principle). The precautionary principle is more widely accepted in Europe as a norm of 
environmental law. For example, the Helsinki Commission that governs transboundary 
pollution issues in the Baltic Sea adopted it as a guiding principle. Convention on the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 1992, art. 3, § 2. 
116 In the authors’ opinion, based on thirty years of experience litigating against, 
working with, and teaching federal agencies about the statute, The National Environmental 
Policy Act’s look-before-you-leap mandate is precautionary in nature because it requires 
information gathering and public involvement before environmental impacts can be 
addressed by government actions. Thus NEPA can lead to the prevention or mitigation of 
environmental impacts before they occur. NEPA is, of course, procedural and not 
substantive, and thus prevents “uninformed—rather than unwise—agency action.” 
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989). 
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approaches, such as NAFTA, where liability is assessed for 
environmental damage after it occurs, the precautionary principle asks 
“whether the dispute involves potential for significant harm, and 
whether this can be shown by clear and convincing evidence.”117 
Under the precautionary principle, environmentally damaging activity 
is foregone until its effects are fully known, and can be mitigated or 
otherwise addressed.118 
Related to the precautionary principle is the norm of state 
responsibility for intergenerational equity. The Rio Declaration 
captures this concept in Principle 3; simply put, intergenerational 
equity means that subsequent generations have a right to the same 
natural heritage that we presently enjoy.119 To preserve that right, 
current generations essentially serve as trustees for future 
generations.120 However, intergenerational equity is possible only if 
the use of natural resources is sustainable. 
3. Sustainability 
Thus, sustainability is a third hallmark of the Rio Declaration that 
has emerged as a key soft law principle. While the precautionary 
principle, intergenerational equity, and sustainability are interrelated, 
the principle of sustainability is often the buzzword for creating a 
more ecologically-based governance. As one scholar notes, the term 
is used in twelve of Rio’s twenty-seven principles.121 
In sum, the precautionary principle, intergenerational equity, and 
sustainability are important soft law principles, and while offering 
guidance, they do not necessarily bind a party to one course of action. 
The United States and Canada are both parties to the Stockholm 
and Rio Declarations, where these principles emerged and were 
essentially codified as soft law. Whether they are recognized as 
 
117 Hernandez, supra note 77, at 574. 
118 See id. at 578 (noting that while the North Fork controversy was still unresolved, the 
precautionary principle was perhaps the best vehicle for the prevention of transboundary 
pollution in the context of protecting the Crown: “the likelihood that significant cross-
border harm will result from the proposed Cline Mine requires Canada to take affirmative 
action to assure that such harm does not occur”). 
119 See Rio Declaration, supra note 110, at princ. 3. 
120 See, e.g., BURNS H. WESTON & TRACY BACH, RECALIBRATING THE LAW OF 
HUMANS WITH THE LAWS OF NATURE: CLIMATE CHANGE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 60 (The Climate Legacy Initiative, Vt. Law Sch. & The 
Univ. of Iowa eds., 2009), available at http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/CLI%20 
Policy%20Paper/CLI_Policy_Paper.pdf. 
121 See Brunnee, supra note 111, at 46–47. 
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customary practices or enforceable norms of international law is a 
matter of scholarly debate. Yet, these norms permeated the 
controversy regarding transboundary pollution in the Flathead region 
and are thus important to bear in mind. For example, the concept of 
intergenerational equity is often espoused, perhaps unknowingly, by 
politicians waxing eloquently on the values of the Crown.122 
Beyond the precautionary principle, some scholars argue for an 
enforceable human right to a clean and healthy environment.123 Such 
a right can be inferred from the growing body of national 
constitutions and regional treaties that recognize environmental rights 
together with more traditional rights pertaining to democratic 
governance, due process, freedoms of speech, assembly, religion, and 
so forth. However, no international treaty recognizes the right to a 
clean and healthy environment as a fundamental, enforceable human 
right. A few countries have such constitutional environmental 
rights,124 but neither the United States nor Canada have anything 
resembling such a right. On the other hand, Montana’s state 
constitution has declared that all citizens have a fundamental 
constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment and a 
corresponding duty to protect the environment.125 
4. Environmental Impact Assessment 
Since the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) in 1970, impact assessment has been a mainstay of U.S. 
environmental law and policy. The U.S. Supreme Court, while 
repeatedly reversing circuit court decisions advancing a broader, more 
 
122 As Lt. Governor John Bohlinger stated in a speech to Canadian government 
officials: 
One truth is certain: the Flathead River and its tributaries are unique among all 
the rivers of North America. The corollary of this truth is that it is irreplaceable. . 
. . We need . . . to insure that our shared environment is protected for not only 
ourselves, but for our children, and our children’s children. 
Montana Lieutenant Governor John Bohlinger, Speech to the Flathead Basin Commission 
in Kalispell, MT (Dec. 7, 2005) (on file with authors). 
123 See, e.g., Luis E. Rodriguez-Rivera, Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized 
Under International Law? It Depends on the Source, 12 COLO. J. INT’L ENTL. L. & POL’Y 
1, 17 (2001). 
124 See, e.g., EARTHJUSTICE, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REPORT 2007: HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2007), available at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files 
/library/references/2007-environmental-rights-report.pdf. 
125 MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The state and each person shall maintain and improve a 
clean and healthful environmentin [sic] Montana for present and future generations.”). 
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substantive interpretation, has sustained NEPA’s look-before-you-
leap mandate and highlighted the critical importance of excellent 
analysis and public involvement in the procedural planning 
process.126 Environmental impact assessment is thoroughly engrained 
in federal agencies as a necessary planning tool.127 In addition, NEPA 
has spawned over thirty state environmental acts that fill an important 
gap in addressing activities of state governments that are not covered 
by NEPA. Also, impact assessment as a norm of environmental law is 
widely embraced in many countries.128 
While impact assessment is often a mere procedural prelude to 
resource development and environmental degradation, it is 
precautionary in nature because the assessment and disclosure of 
impacts occur before the impacts. Thus, the impact assessment 
provides an opportunity to address alternatives, adequately assess all 
impacts, and even rally public opposition to force curtailment or 
significant modification of the proposal. 
5. The Public Trust Doctrine 
The Public Trust Doctrine (“Doctrine”) is another norm of 
environmental law that has traction in both the United States and 
Canada. With roots in Roman law,129 the Public Trust Doctrine 
 
126 The continual pounding that environmentalists have taken at the U.S. Supreme 
Court, where they have lost the last dozen or so NEPA cases has been tempered by the 
Court’s reaffirmation of NEPA’s basic principles. For example, in Robertson v. Methow 
Valley Citizens Council, the Court explained that “by focusing the agency’s attention on 
the environmental consequences of a proposed project, NEPA ensures that important 
effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered after resources have 
been committed or the die otherwise cast.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 
490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). The Court reaffirmed the principle that an impact assessment 
requires a hard look at adverse impacts, and that NEPA ensures that the public will be 
fully informed about those impacts. Id. 
127 The authors’ opinion is based on thirty years of working with, and litigating against 
federal agencies. While federal agencies may prepare substandard documents or create 
exemptions from NEPA, agencies embrace the need for compliance, a far cry from 
NEPA’s early days when agencies sought to avoid the statute entirely. See, e.g., Calvert 
Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). 
128 Owen McIntyre, The Role of Customary Rules and Principles of International 
Environmental Law in the Protection of Shared International Freshwater Resources, 46 
Nat. Resources J. 157, 199 (2006) (“Even those commentators who do not accept that the 
requirement to conduct transboundary EIA stems from the duty to prevent transboundary 
harm do not argue that the requirement enjoys no normative status in general international 
law . . . .”). 
129 According to the Justinian’s codification of Roman law, 
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embraces the notion that some resources—air, water, seashores, wild 
animals—are not subject to privatization and are available to all 
citizens. Under this doctrine, the government has a corresponding 
duty to protect the rest of the public trust. The Doctrine is a widely 
accepted, though less than clearly defined, principle of U.S. law in the 
context of water-based navigation, recreation, tidal lands, and 
shorelines.130 At the same time, the Doctrine is gaining recognition 
throughout the world in contexts other than navigable waters.131 
Broadly speaking, the Doctrine is rooted in the above-discussed 
norms of intergenerational equity and sustainability: certain resources 
are so fundamental and common to all persons that the government 
owes a duty to preserve them for all persons in perpetuity. Public trust 
resources, which in the United States includes rivers, lakes, and 
shorelines up to the high water mark, cannot be privatized or 
despoiled to the detriment of future generations.132 In the United 
States, the Public Trust Doctrine is arguably a backstop preventing 
private ownership of water resources.133 
While Canadian courts have not formally recognized the Public 
Trust Doctrine as a binding legal principle, some scholars have found 
a basis for applying public trust principles in Canada. Canadian courts 
 
By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running 
water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No one, therefore, is 
forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he respects habitationes, 
monuments, and buildings which are not, like the sea, subject only to the law of 
nations. 
J. INST. 2.1.1. 
130 The literature and case law on the Public Trust Doctrine is rich, beginning with the 
seminal article by Joseph Sax and continuing with commentary on a wide variety of 
applications. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: 
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Alexandra B. Klass, Modern 
Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 699 (2006); Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A 
Lakeside View into the Trustees’ World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123 (2012). 
131 See, e.g., M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath & Ors, 2002 1 S.C.C. 388, 388 (India) 
(utilizing the doctrine by invoking both Justinian and U.S. judicial decisions to overrule a 
motel development that adversely affected the course of a river). 
132 In 1892, the U.S. Supreme Court established the concept that public rights in waters 
and shorelines are paramount. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (stating that 
“[t]he State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are 
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under 
the use and control of private parties . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the 
administration of government and the preservation of the peace” ). Id. at 454. 
133 John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles Defense 
in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931 (2012). 
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have recognized the concept in terms of navigable waters and defined 
a trust for the public uses that nature intended of them.134 While the 
Doctrine is not as legally robust in Canada as it is in the United 
States, commentators opine that its principles are part of Canadian 
law.135 Citizens active in promoting a Great Lakes Commons,136 led 
by Canadian water activist Maude Barlow and U.S. Attorney James 
Olson, have formally petitioned the IJC to recognize the Public Trust 
Doctrine as a guiding principle under the Boundary Waters Treaty, 
based upon a request that is pending at the time this article is 
written.137 
6. Transboundary Ecosystem Management 
Ecosystem management is becoming the norm for many 
government land managers, replacing traditional resource-based 
management regimes. While defining what constitutes ecosystem 
management is itself controversial, for purposes of this article, 
ecosystem management means sustainably managing the whole of the 
natural system—water, wildlife, flora, etc.—rather than managing 
specific commodities like timber or hydropower. The concept of 
ecosystem management is widely accepted but difficult to implement 
in a single country, let alone across international boundaries. For 
example, the law of ecosystem management on U.S. public lands, or 
lack thereof, has been the subject of scholarly literature for a long 
time.138 Aspects of ecosystem management are found implicitly in 
many U.S. laws, but explicitly in none.139 Competing jurisdictions on 
 
134 See Corp. of Vancouver v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., [1894] 23 S.C.R. 1, 6, 17–19, 
(Can.); Nickerson v. Atty General of Canada, [1999] S.H. 150869 (N.S.S.C.). 
135 See, e.g., RALPH PENTLAND, POLIS, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: POTENTIAL IN 
CANADIAN WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 1–7 (2009), available at 
http://poliswaterproject.org/sites/default/files/public_trust_doctrine.pdf; Oliver M. Brandes 
& Randy Christensen, The Public Trust and a Modern BC Water Act, 1 POLIS WATER 
SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT: THE FUTURE OF WATER LAW & GOVERNANCE SERIES 1 
(2010). 
136 See Maude Barlow, How to Save Our Great Lakes, HUFFINGTON POST: CAN. (Dec. 
14, 2011, 1:45 PM ET), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/maude-barlow/how-to  
-save-our-great-lakes_b_1148758.html. 
137 Report to the International Joint Commission on the Principles of the Public Trust 
Doctrine Submitted on Behalf of Council of Canadians (Le Conseil des Canadiens) and 
Flow for Water (Couler pour L’eau), November 30, 2011 (on file with authors). 
138 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Management, the ESA, and the Seven Degrees of 
Relevance, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 156 (2000); Carol M. Rose, Demystifying 
Ecosystem Management, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 865, 865–70 (1997). 
139 For example, the preface to the National Environmental Policy Act states that the 
law “will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his 
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federal lands (e.g., Forest Service vs. Park Service) and between state 
and federal lands make cooperation complicated, even if the potential 
for ecosystem management exists.140 However, regulations in the new 
2012 National Forest Management Act expressly incorporate 
ecosystem management and strive to work across artificial political 
boundaries.141 These regulations perhaps herald a more enlightened 
approach to resource management based on ecological rather than 
political boundaries. But an ecosystem management mandate in U.S. 
statutory law is a long way off.142 
The international “law” of ecosystem management is widely 
embraced in scientific discourse, and its principles appear in 
international conventions. For example, The Convention of Biological 
Diversity (“Convention”) stated that “the ecosystem approach should 
be the primary framework of action to be taken under the 
Convention.”143 However, the Convention is a framework for 
 
environment” and will be used “to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage 
to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4321 (2012). The language supports a holistic ecosystem based approach but does not 
require it. The closest that statutory law gets to ecosystem management is in the Purposes 
section of the ESA, which states: “The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means 
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend 
may be conserved.” 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012). However, the ESA applies only to listed 
species.  Additionally, the  substantive commands in Sections 7 and 9 of the ESA are not 
predicated on ecosystem management, but rather on discrete actions of federal agencies in 
the case of Section 7, or discrete actions of individuals, corporations and government 
entities for Section 9. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2), 1538(a). 
140 Professor Robert Keiter has written extensively on this subject. See Robert B. 
Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 293, 295 (1994) (discussing how conventional resource management 
statutes can be used to further the concept of ecosystem management, though noting that 
no statute requires it); see also Robert B. Keiter, Conservation Biology and the Law: 
Assessing the Challenges Ahead, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 911 (1994). 
141 National Forest System Land Management Planning, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,162 (Apr. 9, 
2012) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219); see also U.S. Forest Service Summary of Final 
Land Management Planning Rule (Mar. 23, 2012) (on file with authors) (“In the face of 
changing environmental conditions and stressors, such as a changing climate, the final 
planning rule requires plans to include plan components to . . . maintain and restore 
ecosystem and watershed health and resilience (ecological integrity) . . . .”). 
142 The enduring legacy of fractured land disposition and ownership in the western 
United States remains a primary culprit thwarting ecosystem management. The 
checkerboard pattern of alternating land ownership means that in a given ecosystem, there 
will be multiple federal agencies, Indian Reservations, state lands and private lands. These 
various land managers/owners operate under different legal mandates and controls. 
143 Second Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, dec. II/8, Nov. 6–17, 1995, available at http://www.cbd.int/decision 
/cop/default.shtml?id=7081; see also Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 8(d), Dec, 
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promoting ecosystem protection, not a blueprint for actual 
management. Nor does it contain a hard law enforcement mechanism 
to require any level of ecosystem management between nations. 
Nonetheless, the Convention promotes the concept of transboundary 
ecosystem management and helps establish its normative value in the 
discourse on transboundary pollution. 
Aside from ecosystem management and other environmental law 
norms, is the principle of subsidiarity. Although this other facet of 
international law is not particular to environmental law, the principle 
of subsidiarity is nevertheless important to understanding the dispute 
over transboundary pollution. This principle embraces the concept 
that problems should be solved and action should be taken at the 
lowest level of governance appropriate to the situation.144 The 
principle extends far beyond environmental law into many realms of 
governance.145 Indeed, it is a principle that supports the very 
foundation of the E.U.,146 and is stated as a principle of E.U. 
governance. In that context it is hard law. Subsidiarity is relevant here 
not because it is reflected in the treaties or conventions applicable to 
this dispute, or even because it is openly embraced as a norm for 
solving transboundary pollution problems, but rather because the 
successful conclusion of the North Fork dispute involved local actors 
with a direct stake in the controversy, not those at the national level. 
While none of the foregoing precepts of international law 
constitute hard law, they all ultimately bear on the North Fork 
dispute. Soft law principles proved to be important. Canada could not 
disclaim its responsibility for sending pollution into U.S. waters. The 
Boundary Waters Treaty and the World Heritage Site petition process 
 
29, 1993, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (providing that each contracting party shall “[p]romote the 
protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable populations of 
species in natural surroundings”). 
144 See, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiary Seriously: Federalism in the 
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994). 
145 Id. 
146 Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European 
Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 846, 847–48 (1994) 
(“On the one hand, integration was to be deepened, in particular, through an 
unprecedented extension of the powers conferred upon the European Community (or 
“Union”). On the other hand, the confidence of the Member States, as well as of their 
subnational authorities and citizens, was to be maintained through the solemn guarantee of 
the proximity of government. In other words, integration was not to lead to undue 
centralization.”); see also The Principle of Subsidiarity, EUROPA, http://europa.eu 
/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0017_en.htm (last 
updated Mar. 3, 2010). 
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generated important impact assessments that were respected by both 
sides. The designation of part of the Crown as a World Heritage Site 
constitutes international recognition of the area’s ecological 
significance. Intergenerational equity is understood when discussed in 
the context of a priceless heritage that must be protected so our 
children can enjoy it. Finally, and most importantly, the principle of 
subsidiarity operated successfully because local interests, not national 
sovereigns, resolved this matter before the problem became acute. 
III 
FEDERAL U.S. AND CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
While national environmental laws cannot reach directly across 
borders, they can play a role in solving transboundary issues. A 
digression into federal environmental laws on both sides of the border 
illustrates how they operate in the Crown. 
Drawing from the multitude of federal environmental laws passed 
in the 1970s,147 American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
flocked to the courts when federal agencies balked at environmental 
protection. In turn, federal courts played a significant role in giving 
meaning to federal statutes, forcing federal agencies into compliance 
and halting resource development in the process. The Crown was no 
exception. 
Early in the 1980s, during the pro-development Reagan 
administration, then Secretary of the Interior James Watt proposed 
extensive oil and gas leasing on the Flathead and Lewis and Clark 
National Forests just south of Glacier National Park.148 These 
proposals would have opened millions of acres of federal lands to oil 
and gas development.149 The twin clubs of the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA)150 and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)151 
 
147 In keeping with a growing national awareness of the environment symbolized by the 
first Earth Day in April 1970, Congress passed a plethora of environmental statutes in the 
early 1970s, including the National Environmental Policy Act (1970), National Forest 
Management Act (1976), and large sections of the currently operative versions of the 
Federal Clean Water Act (1972), Clean Air Act (1970) and Endangered Species Act 
(1973). 
148 See, e.g., Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 1988). 
149 Id. 1227–30. 
150 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012). The ESA prevents the federal government from 
taking actions that jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or that adversely 
modify critical habitat. The statute prevents any person from “taking” a protected species, 
either directly or through habitat modification. The ESA is widely regarded as one of the 
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clobbered these proposals into oblivion.152 While courts could not 
prohibit oil and gas leasing under these laws, the lawsuits delayed 
drilling and increased public awareness about the importance of these 
lands through public participation and impact statement requirements. 
The same legal structure could be used administratively to protect 
the lands. In 1997, Lewis and Clark National Forest supervisor Gloria 
Flora closed much of the Rocky Front to oil and gas leasing through a 
revision in the forest management plan under the National Forest 
Management Act.153 Her controversial move, which reversed decades 
of policy permitting oil and gas leasing of nearly all National Forest 
lands unprotected by formal wilderness designation, was 
unsuccessfully challenged by the oil and gas industry.154 
Americans have used the courts to protect the Crown from other 
development activities. In 1994, the Ninth Circuit overturned the 
Flathead National Forest Plan because it failed to justify the amount 
of logging permitted under the Plan in its environmental review under 
NEPA.155 Other court cases have successfully challenged forest, 
logging, and road development because of the adverse impacts that 
excessive road densities have on grizzly bears.156 Even within the 
protected confines of Glacier Park, courts have protected the Park 
from attempts by inholders to increase motorized access to the 
 
world’s most stringent environmental laws; in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
law “admits of no exception.” Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978). 
Professor Zygmunt Plater describes the ESA as a revolutionary legal document and “the 
first major piece of legislation in any legal system . . . . to put teeth into the protection of 
endangered species.” PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 775 (3rd ed. 2004). 
151 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70 (2012). NEPA requires environmental impact statements for 
all federal actions that significantly affect the environment, thus implicating most activities 
that occur in National Forests and National Parks. Id. 
152 See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988); Bob Marshall Alliance, 
852 F.2d at 1230. These cases demonstrate the power of NEPA’s demanding impact 
assessment requirements. While NEPA’s mandate is procedural, it was an effective means 
to thwart energy development in the Crown. 
153 For a discussion of the events leading to the decision to forestall leasing in the 
Forest lands, see Martin Nie, The Use of Co-Management and Protected Land-Use 
Designations to Protect Tribal Cultural Resources and Reserved Treaty Rights on Federal 
Lands, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 585, 601 (2008). 
154 See Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.2d 1142, (D. 
Mont. 2000), aff’d, 12 F. App’x 498 (9th Cir. 2001). 
155 Res. Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (9th Cir. 1993). 
156 See, e.g., Swan View Coal., Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 940 (D. Mont. 1992). 
TUHOLSKI (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  12:24 PM 
2014] Solving Transboundary Pollution Disputes Locally: 687 
Success in the Crown of the Continent 
detriment of wildlife.157 Montana state law, specifically the Montana 
Environmental Policy Act, can also mandate the assessment of 
environmental impacts on state lands not under the jurisdiction of 
NEPA or the ESA, and NGOs have used state law to protect areas 
within the Crown.158 
Although U.S. environmental laws cannot reach directly across the 
border, they can still affect transboundary pollution issues. The laws 
provide the United States with moral authority regarding the high 
value Americans place on water quality, wildlife, and wilderness. 
These laws also embody the look-before-you-leap principle of impact 
assessment. 
Finally, the role of U.S. environmental law in addressing 
transboundary disputes has received attention in the courts in recent 
years. For example, the province of Manitoba successfully pursued a 
NEPA claim against a federal agency that was going to permit a 
massive water diversion in North Dakota that would affect Canadian 
waters.159 Other recent cases involve Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and Clean Air 
Act (CAA) claims dealing with transboundary pollution on both sides 
of the border.160 Professor Noah Hall found these recent cases 
indicative of the failure of the national governments to address 
transboundary issues, a thesis that is consistent with this case study 
and discussed in great detail below.161 
 
157 McFarland v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2008) (preventing private 
property inholder from obtaining permit for snowmobile use in an area otherwise closed to 
such uses to protect wildlife). 
158 See, e.g., N. Fork Pres. Ass’n v. Dep’t of State Lands, 778 P.2d 862 (Mont. 1989). 
This case concerned a challenge under the Montana Environmental Policy Act against 
drilling of a single test well on state lands in close proximity to Glacier National Park. Id. 
at 863. While the court held that a full environmental impact statement was not required, 
the court noted that impacts from a single well were not significant, and that a full 
statement would likely be necessary if full-field development ensued. Id. at 872–73. 
159 See, e.g., Gov’t of the Province of Manitoba v. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 
2005). 
160 See, e.g., Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 WL 
2578982 (D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004) (holding a Canadian company liable for toxic waste 
generated in Canada that polluted U.S. lands); see also Merrill, supra note 62, at 956 
(discussing CAA section 115 as a tool used by other nations to challenge transboundary air 
pollution); Her Majesty The Queen ex rel. Ont. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 912 F.2d 
1525, 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
161 Noah Hall, Bilateral Breakdown: U.S.-Canada Pollution Disputes, 21 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 18 (2006). 
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North of the border, Canada’s federal companion to the ESA is the 
Species at Risk Act (SRA),162 while the now repealed Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) had formerly provided an 
analog to the American NEPA.163 Unfortunately, Canadian 
environmental regulations lack strong substantive and procedural 
hooks and have received scant judicial attention and enforcement 
compared to their American counterparts. 
Neither the CEAA nor the SRA would ultimately stop the mining 
projects in the North Fork, though compliance must be gained prior to 
mining operations. While the SRA could provide some means of 
protection, it does not have the substantive, far-reaching handles that 
the U.S. ESA contains. And while the CEAA appears to offer the 
primary means for addressing detrimental impacts associated with any 
project in the area,164 the CEAA requires an environmental 
assessment for projects but allows for nearly unfettered action at the 
provincial level, provided the provincial process appears equivalent to 
national standards.165 
After the initial phases of the Cabin Creek and Cline mining 
proposals discussed below, the CEAA underwent substantial changes 
under the Jobs and Economic Growth Act.166 These changes included 
 
162 Species at Risk Act, S.C. 2002, c. 24–29 (Can.). 
163 See Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37 (Can.), available at 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-15.2/FullText.html (for past iterations of the law, 
click the “Previous Versions” link, which directs you to the page: http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-15.2/PITIndex.html, where past versions of the law are 
available). 
164 Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, The Realities of Regional Resource Management: 
Glacier National Park and Its Neighbors Revisited, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 291 (2006) 
[hereinafter Sax & Keiter II]. As noted by Sax and Keiter, the mine proposal would trigger 
the CEAA if it would “cause significant adverse environmental effects both outside 
Canada and outside those federal lands.” Id. at 291 (citing Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act, S.C. c. 37, § 47 (2005) (repealed 2012), available at http://laws-lois 
.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-15.2/20050804/P1TT3xt3.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2013)). 
165 Stepan Wood, Georgia Tanner & Benjamin J. Richardson, What Ever Happened to 
Canadian Environmental Law?, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 981, 1019 (2010) (“The Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act of 1999 and the [CEAA] also contemplate a role for the 
provinces if they have equivalent standards. Such concessions can give provincial 
governments the final say on how strict environmental assessments will be, allowing the 
federal government to delegate environmental responsibilities to the provinces.”) (citations 
omitted). As Wood et al. explain, “[t]he results differ substantially” from province to 
province in terms of environmental assessment requirements. Id. at 1020. 
166 See Parliament Passes Amendments to Environmental Assessment Act, 
ENVIRONMENTAL-EXPERT (July 13, 2010), http://www.environmental-expert.com/news 
/parliament-passes-amendments-to-environmental-assessment-act-181466 (“The sections 
of Bill C-9 relating to the environmental review process are intended to strengthen 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) ability to improve the timeliness of 
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more stringent requirements for review of mining and energy 
proposals,167 including those relative to the Cline proposal.168 
Moreover, the amendments to the CEAA occurred after noted failures 
of the Act came to light.169 The enacted amendments eliminated a 
track review process and streamlined the procedure for environmental 
assessment.170 By doing so, the Canadian government accepted a 
larger share of responsibility for ensuring accurate and appropriate 
environmental assessments.171 While the concordant mechanisms at 
the provincial level would still exist, they would no longer replace, or 
displace, the federal assessment process. Of course, assessments 
merely ensure that a government body adequately reviews a proposed 
project to incorporate all future impacts into a decision to proceed. 
Any assessment does not, by itself, foreclose a project going forward. 
Nonetheless, increased responsibility at the national level would 
ensure that the Canadian government acts cautiously when overseeing 
any prospective development.172 Ultimately, however, the role of 
 
federal environmental assessments; to establish clear lines of accountability; and to focus 
resources where they could produce the greatest benefit to the environment and the 
economy.”). 
167 See Canadian Envtl. Assessment Agency, Amendments to the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act, http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&xml=B6531 
D7A-8F4C-4A1B-AB90-4A99B713B579 (last modified Sept. 24, 2013) (“Recent 
amendments to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act to strengthen the role of the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency will improve timeliness of federal 
environmental assessment, establish clear accountability and focus resources where they 
would produce the greatest benefit to the environment and the economy. The changes are 
part of the Jobs and Economic Growth Act that came into effect on July 12, 2010.”). For a 
thorough report on the rationale behind the amendments and a comprehensive explanation 
of their effect, see CAN. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT TRACK PROCESS UNDER THE CANADIAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT ACT (2010), available at http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/81 
D6DF0E-A184-4891-9B63-ADE35C22744C/Effectiveness_of_the_Environmental 
_Assessment_Track_Process.pdf. 
168 Lodgepole Coal Mine Project, CAN. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY 
http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/052/details-eng.cfm?pid=36059 (last modified Dec. 5, 2012). 
169 Id. at 1 (noting that reports “had suggested that, in at least some cases, the 
environmental assessment track process was causing delay while not significantly adding 
value to the assessment . . . [and] it had appeared to have discouraged effective 
cooperation between federal and provincial government departments and agencies in those 
situations where an environmental assessment of the same project had been concurrently 
required by both federal and provincial legislation”). 
170 Id. at 21. 
171 Id. 
172 Though not specifically recognized as a contributing factor, the Canadian 
government did halt progress on the Cline Mine Proposal pending a more thorough 
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Canadian law in addressing transboundary pollution does not appear 
to be significant. 
IV 
THE RISING THREAT OF TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION IN THE 
CROWN 
A. The Cabin Creek Mine 
Energy development on the Canadian side of the border was 
traditionally confined to coal mining in the Sparwood area.173 As 
discussed above, interest in oil and gas on the American side of the 
border grew heavily in the 1970s and 1980s with serious attempts to 
lease oil and gas resources in the Rockies just south of Glacier 
National Park, but waned thereafter. However, interest in carbon 
resources in the Canadian Flathead gained renewed strength in the 
1980s, setting the stage for a transboundary pollution dispute. 
In the early 1980s, a Canadian mining company sought approval 
for two large open-pit coal mines along Cabin Creek in British 
Columbia, just above its confluence with the Flathead, a mere six 
miles from the U.S. border.174 These proposals generated huge 
protests from Montana environmentalists, Glacier National Park 
managers, and American politicians. Americans feared pollution of 
the North Fork from the coal mines.175 The fact that the North Fork 
River constitutes Glacier’s western boundary and feeds the pristine 
Flathead Lake roused the passions of more than the usual 
environmental NGOs; Montana’s congressional delegation pressured 
the State Department to refer the water pollution issue to the IJC, 
which it did.176 
 
review, offering at least an inference that the development companies would have to suffer 
through a longer period of review than initially anticipated. 
173 Sax & Keiter II, supra note 164, at 287–88. 
174 INT’L JOINT COMM’N, IMPACTS OF A PROPOSED COAL MINE IN THE FLATHEAD 
RIVER BASIN 19 (1988), available at http://www.ijc.org/files/publications/ID590.pdf (“In 
February 1984, the British Columbia Government granted Sage Creek Coal Limited 
approval-in-principle for a 2.2 million tonnes (2.4 million U.S. tons) per year thermal coal 
mine located 10 km (6 mi) upstream from the International Boundary on Howell and 
Cabin creeks, tributaries to the Flathead River.”). 
175 Canadian Mine Called Pollution Peril to U.S. Park, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 1981), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/10/15/us/canadian-mine-called-pollution-peril-to-us-park 
.html. 
176 See INT’L JOINT COMM’N, supra note 174, at 3. 
TUHOLSKI (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  12:24 PM 
2014] Solving Transboundary Pollution Disputes Locally: 691 
Success in the Crown of the Continent 
As discussed above, for the IJC to obtain jurisdiction, both national 
sovereigns must consent, making unilateral enforcement impossible. 
However, Canada consented to the State Department’s referral of the 
Cabin Creek mine dispute, and the IJC assumed jurisdiction to 
address the adverse effects of pollution from coal mining in Canada 
on U.S. waters. The IJC, in turn, assembled a group of scientific 
experts from both countries to study the mine’s impacts on the river 
system.177 In 1988, the IJC adopted the experts’ recommendation to 
refuse approval of the mine in its current configuration, partially 
because of potential adverse impacts to water quality and fisheries, 
and especially due to the adverse impacts to bull trout.178 The IJC 
noted a possible violation of the Boundary Waters Treaty because of 
impacts from coal mining and associated development.179 The IJC’s 
report further recommended that mining be postponed until the 
impacts of transboundary pollution had been determined and both 
governments agreed upon an acceptable mitigation plan.180 Finally, 
the report recommended that both governments work to develop joint 
sustainable, equitable, and compatible development activities and 
management strategies.181 
However, the IJC recommendations were not binding, and while 
the British Columbian government stated it was “satisfied with the 
IJC’s findings,”182 the Canadian government never formally accepted 
the IJC’s findings. Nevertheless, the lack of formal approval by the 
Canadian government did not undercut the strength of the IJC’s 
recommendations. The coal company allowed its provincial permit to 
lapse.183 At the same time the Canadian coal project was shelved, 
Montana, in an act of rebuke against the IJC recommendation for 
more cooperation on managing the Flathead, approved an oil and gas 
 
177 See generally id. 
178 Id. at 24–25. Bull trout (salvilunus confluentus) are protected as threatened species 
under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012). The species is 
native to Canada, and the North Fork population is considered both a stronghold of the 
species and vital to its recovery. See INT’L JOINT COMM’N, supra note 174, at 7, 24–25. 
179 INT’L JOINT COMM’N, supra note 174, at 6–8. As discussed above, Article IV of the 
Boundary Waters Treaty states that “waters flowing across the boundary shall not be 
polluted on either side.” Id. at 8. The scientific study documented serious potential impacts 
from coal mining, which were then adopted by the IJC. Id. at 6–8. 
180 Id. at 11. 
181 Id. 
182 Dino Ross, International Management of the Flathead River Basin, 1 COLO. J. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 223, 231 (1990). 
183 Id. (providing information about the early years of the North Fork dispute). 
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well on state lands near both Glacier Park and the North Fork of the 
Flathead.184 
Whether a result of environmental benevolence, the moral force of 
the IJC’s recommendations, or changing energy markets, the push for 
Flathead coal eventually waned. The Cabin Creek mine controversy 
had lasting implications for future protection of the area. Professors 
Sax and Keiter labeled the IJC’s Cabin Creek decision “a complete 
victory for Montana and Glacier National Park.”185 The threat of 
water pollution from Canadian mining galvanized U.S. opposition to 
Canadian mining in the Flathead, leading to the Montana 
Legislature’s creation of the Flathead Basin Commission, an umbrella 
group that represented and surveyed Montana’s interests in the 
amenity values of the Flathead.186 This political constituency remains 
in place even after the Cabin Creek permit expired. 
Decades later, another coal project sprung to life. Fording Coal 
Limited, Canada’s largest coal company, held three blocks of coal 
licenses—Lodgepole, Harvey Creek, and Lilyburt—on Crown land, 
north of the Cabin Creek licenses.187 Fording drilled test holes on its 
Lodgepole licenses and started to move forward with the project.188 
Again, public opposition surfaced in the United States and the project 
did not move forward quickly. But the company did not let its license 
expire. 
B. The Cline Proposal 
In 2004, the most recent effort to tap into North Fork coal reserves 
surfaced. The Cline Mining Company sought approval for a fast-track 
 
184 Id. at 232–35 (noting that Montana’s approval of the oil and gas well was essentially 
a slap in the face to the Canadians, who could not invoke the Boundary Waters Treaty 
because the pollution did not flow across the border). Yet, despite Montana’s actions, the 
damage from an oil spill, as well as the habitat destruction from drilling, would 
undoubtedly affect the transborder ecosystem. 
185 Sax & Keiter II, supra note 164, at 296. 
186 About FBC, FLATHEAD BASIN COMM’N, www.flatheadbasincommission.org (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2014) (“The Flathead Basin Commission (FBC) was created in 1983 by the 
Montana Legislature to monitor and protect water quality, natural resources  and economic 
integrity in the Flathead Basin. The FBC is a uniquely structured non-regulatory 
organization that accomplishes its mandate in a consensus-building manner, stressing 
education, partnerships with agencies and nonprofit groups, and the voluntary participation 
of basin residents.”). 
187 See James R. Connor, Fording Coal LTD Investigating Possibility of Developing 
Coal Mine in Flathead’s North Fork, FLATHEAD MEMO, http://www.flatheadmemo 
.com/north_fork_coal/Coal/News/threat.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
188 Id. 
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small mining operation on the Lodgepole leases which then quickly 
morphed into a larger proposal to mine two to three million tons of 
coal per year for export.189 The fast-track proposal would be based on 
the “small mines” review process, which under Canadian law entails 
limited environmental review and data collection.190 While not large 
by comparison to many open pit mines, the Cline mine represented a 
serious and significant intrusion into the pristine areas of the 
Canadian Flathead at a time when provincial governments favored 
economic development. Bearing in mind that the United States had 
recently imposed a surcharge on Canadian softwood imports, Canada 
was presumably unlikely to grant environmental favors to the United 
States. Moreover, Montana itself was promoting development of its 
vast coal reserves in the southeastern part of the state.191 
Cline pushed its proposal for the mine and quickly constructed a 
road into the Flathead drainage during the winter of 2004-2005, 
before any environmental assessment was undertaken.192 The 
development of a new open pit coal mine in a pristine area of the 
Crown seemed imminent. 
The Cline proposal generated intense opposition in Montana. 
Concern focused on water pollution from the mine degrading the 
Flathead River system (which forms the western boundary of Glacier) 
all the way to Flathead Lake.193 Montana has focused intense efforts 
 
189 CLINE MINING CORP., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2004), available at http://www 
.clinemining.com/financials/pdf/04ar.pdf. 
190 Michael Jamison, Concerns Voiced Over ‘Fast-Track’ Proposal, MISSOULIAN (June 
19, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/concerns-voiced-over 
-fast-track-proposal/article_1aaf4831-1f8f-568f-877f-2c475f6f0d60.html. 
191 Montana has the largest coal reserves of any state in the United States, and some of 
the largest in the world. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AT THE 
MONTANA DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MONTANA MEANS BUSINESS 3 (2012). Governor 
Schweitzer originally pushed a coal to diesel project. Samuel Western, Spinning Coal into 
Gasoline, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.hcn.org/issues/334/16681. 
When funding did not materialize, he leased over a half billion tons of Powder River Basin 
coal at Otter Creek to Arch Coal Company. See Press Release, Arch Coal, Arch Coal and 
Great Northern Properties Enter into Montana Coal Lease on Otter Creek Reserves, (Nov. 
12, 2009), available at http://news.archcoal.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=107109&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1355044&highlight=. The controversial leasing decision is embroiled in 
litigation. See, e.g., N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 
1073 (9th Cir. 2011). 
192 Jim Robbins, Coal Mine ‘Under the Radar’ Stirs Cross-Border Feud, N.Y.TIMES 
(Mar. 15, 20065), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/15/science/15mine.html?pagewanted 
=print&position=&_r=0. 
193 Id. 
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to recover bull trout, a native species sensitive to pollution.194 The 
Flathead has some of the strongest bull trout populations in the lower 
forty-eight states.195 Diverse environmental, political, and economic 
interests coalesced under the Flathead Basin Commission into a 
powerful opposition, led by Montana’s charismatic former governor, 
Brian Schweitzer, himself a long-time Flathead Valley resident. 
C. Coal Bed Methane Development in the Crown 
Threats from energy development along the western flanks of the 
Crown were not confined to coal. In the last decade, proposals to tap 
into the North Fork’s coal bed methane (CBM) reserves have 
surfaced.196 CBM is natural gas trapped in coal seams. Production of 
CBM requires dewatering the coal seam aquifer to release the 
methane adsorbed onto the coal. CBM requires disposal of large 
quantities of groundwater that may be saline or laden with undesirable 
dissolved metals.197 Significant CBM production has occurred in the 
United States since the 1990s and accounts for nearly ten percent of 
U.S. domestic natural gas production.198 Recognizing the importance 
 
194 See, e.g., U.S. FOREST SERVICE, CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR BULL TROUT ON 
USFS LANDS IN WESTERN MONTANA 7–8 (2013), available at http://www.fs.usda.gov 
/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5427869.pdf; see also MONTANA BULL TROUT 
RESTORATION TEAM, RESTORATION PLAN FOR BULL TROUT IN THE CLARK FORK RIVER 
BASIN AND KOOTENAI RIVER BASIN MONTANA (2000), available at fwp.mt.gov 
/fwpDoc.html?id=31386. Bull Trout were listed under the Endangered Species Act as a 
result of litigation in the 1990s. See, e.g., Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Serv., 945 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Or. 1996). For extensive background information 
about this species, which is also wide-ranging in southeastern British Columbia, see Gary 
Carnefix, Montana’s Fish Species of Special Concern: Bull Trout, (Jan. 2002), 
http://www.fisheries society.org/AFSmontana/SSCpages/Bull%20Trout.htm. 
195 See Montana Field Guides: Bull Trout, MT.GOV, http://fieldguide.mt.gov/detail 
_AFCHA05020.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (depicting a geographic map of the 
western hemisphere illustrating the range of the Bull Trout, with a substantial portion of 
the Bull Trout habitat overlapping Montana). 
196 N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration and Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1158 
(9th Cir. 2003) (explaining the historical and current efforts to extract coal bed methane in 
portions of Montana). 
197 See generally id. (holding that disposal of groundwater from CBM production 
contained pollutants within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, and further noting that its 
salinity was a threat to soils and crops, which required that the CBM company obtain a 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permit before creating further 
discharges). 
198 Coalbed Methane Outreach Program, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cmop/faq.html (last updated Apr. 19, 2013) 
(describing CBM as a “valuable resource that accounts for about 10% of total U.S. natural 
gas production annually,” and discussing the differences between coal bed methane and 
coal mine methane). 
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of this energy source, British Columbia sought to increase CBM 
production as part of its 2007 B.C. Energy Plan.199 
Between 2001 and 2004, Encana200 drilled CBM test wells in 
British Columbia without any environmental review, and in 2005 the 
British Columbia government auctioned CBM leases in the Elk River 
Valley without conducting any environmental review.201 These 
actions occurred at a time when CBM development was booming in 
the Powder River Basin despite undergoing extensive environmental 
review in Montana because of concerns over water quality and other 
adverse impacts. Montana farmers have been particularly wary of 
CBM development because Wyoming has sent large quantities of 
CBM wastewater into the state via the Powder and Tongue Rivers in 
southeastern Montana.202 Because of these impacts, many litigants 
have sought redress in the courts and have been successful in reigning 
in CBM development.203 While Montana first sided with industry, it 
eventually passed stringent water quality standards aimed at limiting 
CBM pollution.204 However, such environmental controls were 
absent in Canada. CBM development in Canada posed another 
potentially serious threat to water quality in Montana. 
 
199 See The BC Energy Plan Highlights, BRITISH COLUMBIA, http://www.energyplan 
.gov.bc.ca/bcep/default.html#3 (last visited Jan. 7, 2014) (noting that the B.C. Energy Plan 
was designed to promote clean, non-nuclear energy development within the Province). 
CBM was included in the portfolio of “clean” energy sources. The BC Energy Plan: A 
Vision for Clean Energy Leadership, Oil and Gas, BRITISH COLUMBIA, http://www.energy 
plan.gov.bc.ca/bcep/default.aspx?hash=9 (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
200 Encana is a major North American energy production company, with resource 
development projects in both the western United States and Canada. See About Us, 
ENCANA, www.encana.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
201 Cf. RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND GEOSCIENCE BRANCH: OIL AND GAS DIVISION, 
BRITISH COLUMBIA, OIL & GAS EXPLORATION: ACTIVITY REPORT 2007–2008, at 37 
(2009), available at http://www.empr.gov.bc.ca/Mining/Geoscience/Publications 
Catalogue/OilGas/OGReports/Documents/2008/OG_Report2008-1.pdf (detailing the coal 
bed methane developments in the Elk Valley region, including those held by Encana). 
202 See, e.g., Scott Streater, Coalbed Methane Decision Adds Salt to Montana Farmers’ 
Wounds, E&E PUBLISHING (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/stories/84044. 
203 See, e.g., N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration and Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 
1155 (9th Cir. 2003); N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 234 P.3d 51 
(Mont. 2010). 
204 See Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Envtl. Review, 199 P.3d 191 (Mont. 
2008). 
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V 
AND NOW, THE REST OF THE STORY . . . 
The Cline mine proposal, along with CBM development, contained 
all of the ingredients of a difficult transboundary resource dispute. 
Canada stood to gain economically from resource development. 
However, water pollution from the projects threatened significant 
impact in the United States.205 The national governments had frosty 
relationships on other resource issues, for instance, the soft wood 
lumber impasse and the Devils Lake controversy.206 Citizens on both 
sides of the border, concerned with protecting the Crown as an 
ecosystem, had little direct recourse. Given the divergent economic 
and political pressure on both sides of the border and the lack of a 
mandatory legal framework to manage a dispute, the Cline mine 
controversy posed a seemingly intractable problem. The intractable 
nature was amplified by British Columbia’s prioritization of energy 
development, while the national government ceded most 
environmental assessment oversight to the province. Yet the result, 
achieved only a few years later, is surprising. 
To tell the story of the successful resolution of the transboundary 
coal-mining dispute, we first examine the failed efforts to once again 
invoke IJC jurisdiction. Then we explore a creative use of the 
UNESCO petitioning process, one that bore no legal victories but 
further galvanized public support for managing the Crown as an 
ecosystem without major resource extraction. Finally, we delve into 
the political machinations on both sides of the border that resulted in 
the subnational Memorandum of Understanding. The Memorandum, a 
nonbinding document, nonetheless reflected a number of soft 
environmental law principles. 
A. Efforts to Invoke International Law 
No international law or treaty could unilaterally allow Montana to 
halt coal mining in the Canadian Flathead. For instance, NAFTA and 
its corresponding environmental provisions offered no recourse, as 
pollution had yet to occur. The Boundary Waters Treaty offered the 
only prospect of using an international treaty to address the 
 
205 See, e.g., Chris Peterson, Upstream from Glacier, Worries About Coal Bed 
Methane, HUNGRY HORSE NEWS (July 14, 2004), http://www.hungryhorsenews.com 
/articles/2004/07/14/news/news01.txt. 
206 For a discussion of the Softwood Lumber Impasse, see Sarah E. Lysons, Resolving 
the Softwood Lumber Dispute, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 407, 424 (2009). 
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transboundary pollution issue. Indeed, the very purpose of the Treaty 
was to resolve issues like the one presented in the North Fork of the 
Flathead. However, the Treaty was never invoked in the Cline mine 
dispute, revealing the Achilles’ heel of the Treaty: its dependence on 
mutual state action by signatories. The U.S. State Department did not 
even make a formal referral to the IJC, despite a request by Montana 
to do so, preferring instead to “welcome discussions with Canada 
concerning an IJC reference.”207 The Canadian national government 
had little interest in taking the matter to the IJC. Relations between 
the two countries on resource issues were strained. Despite signing 
the Softwood Lumber Agreement in 2006—an effort to resolve the 
decades-old charges of Canadian subsidies to its timber industry—the 
parties continued to fight in the international arena.208 
However, the IJC report concerning Cabin Creek continued to 
resonate in the public discourse. Conservationists and politicians 
referred to the report in statements to the public over the Cline 
proposal.209 The Cabin Creek report also served as a catalyst to gather 
baseline data about water quality in the Flathead and the importance 
of the area as a corridor for wildlife movement.210 Furthermore, the 
British Columbia government could not now disavow the report, 
having accepted it fifteen years earlier. 
The designation of the area as a UNESCO World Heritage site 
offered another avenue for invoking international law. In 2006, a 
group of NGOs petitioned the World Heritage Committee of 
 
207 Letter from Charles S. Shapiro, Acting Assistant Sec’y of State, to Brian 
Schweitzer, Governor of Mont. (June 6, 2005) (on file with authors); see also infra note 
239. 
208 See Chi Carmody, International Decisions: Softwood Lumber Dispute (2001-2006), 
100 AM J. INT’L L. 664 (2006). Even after “resolving” the matter through an international 
agreement, the United States continued to press charges, which lead to continued 
arbitration and findings that the Canadian government breached the Softwood Lumber 
Agreement. See Press Release, U.S. Trade Rep., Tribunal Finds Canada Failed to Cure 
Breach of the Softwood Lumber Agreement (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/september/tribunal-finds     
-canada-failed-cure-breach-softwoo (“United States Trade Representative Ronald Kirk 
today announced that an arbitral tribunal has rejected Canadian claims that an offer to pay 
the U.S. Government US$36.66 million cured Canada’s breach of the Softwood Lumber 
Agreement . . . .”). 
209 See, e.g., Susan Gallagher, State, Province Meet on Mining Issue, MISSOULIAN 
(Mar. 22, 2006, 12:00 AM), available at http://missoulian.com/breaker/state-province        
-meet-on-mining-issue-tuesdayposted-on-march/article_44a44533-6f97-5c05-8886-f5f4f 
6455725.html. 
210 INT’L JOINT COMM’N, supra note 174, at App’x A: Letter of Referral. 
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UNESCO (Petition) to have the Crown listed as an endangered site, a 
procedural mechanism available to NGOs under the Convention.211 
Designation of a World Heritage Site as “endangered” would not have 
stopped development because the Convention has no international 
enforcement mechanism. However, much like the IJC report on the 
Cabin Creek mine, the Petition put the Crown’s international 
recognition as a public resource in the spotlight. 
The petitioners submitted their report to the U.N. World Heritage 
Committee on February 26, 2006, setting out the substantive issues 
threatening the Waterton-Glacier (and greater Flathead River Valley) 
region.212 Their primary goal was to secure conservation of the site 
once it was classified as threatened.213 The Petition focused primarily 
on the threat climate change posed to the two national parks, 
incorporating information from the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).214 It set out specific and 
relevant findings attributable to these sources215 before equating the 
 
211 INT’L ENVTL. LAW PROJECT OF LEWIS & CLARK LAW SCH., PETITION TO THE 
WORLD HERITAGE COMMITTEE REQUESTING INCLUSION OF WATERTON-GLACIER 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE PARK ON THE LIST OF WORLD HERITAGE IN DANGER AS A 
RESULT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES AND ACTIONS (2006) 
[hereinafter WATERTON-GLACIER PETITION], available at http://www.climatelaw.org 
/cases/country/intl/unescoglacier/2006Feb16/. With direction from Lewis and Clark’s 
International Environmental Law Project, signatories to the Petition included, inter alia, 
the Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, the Humane Society 
International, and the Montana Wilderness Association. Id. at ii. 
212 Id. at v. 
213 Id. at 4. The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage contains a mechanism to highlight World Heritage sites that are 
endangered and provides a mechanism by which endangered sites are publicized, 
presumably to galvanize support to increase protection. Id. Convention Concerning the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, supra note 11. UNESCO also 
established the system for determining whether a property listed as a World Heritage site 
is endangered under its operational guidelines for implementing the Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. UNESCO, 
Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, § IV(B) 
¶¶ 178, 180–82 (Feb. 2005). 
214 See WATERTON-GLACIER PETITION, supra note 211, at 5–6 (showing that the IPCC 
Report provided the scientific ammunition while the UNFCC provided the legal 
framework in the Petition to highlight the human-generated impact of climate change on 
the Waterton-Glacier heritage site). 
215 The cited material included the warming of global temperatures (noting temperature 
has increased “over the 20th century by .6°C, ± .2°C, with most warming occurring 
between 1910-1945 and 1976-2000”), the cause of this warming as provided by the 
increase in greenhouse gas concentrations, and the change in weather patterns attributable 
to the temperature increase. Id. at 5 (citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
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findings of these international documents to localized impacts in 
Montana and British Columbia.216 The Petition explained the climate 
data accumulated at the parks (set against the broader challenge of 
global climate change), examined the distinct threat the data 
evidenced, and then asked for action from the World Heritage 
Committee. The Petition pointed out that the specific factors that had 
led to the area’s designation as a World Heritage site217 were now 
threatened.218 For instance, the Petition directly stated that, “[d]ue to 
temperature increases and fluctuations in precipitation, climate 
change is already jeopardizing the complex climate of Waterton-
Glacier’s ‘distinctive climate’ . . . .”219 The natural and unique 
climate of the area was one of the key factors the U.N. Heritage 
Committee relied upon in designating Waterton-Glacier a World 
Heritage site. The Petition posited that the single greatest threat to the 
parks rested with climate change, thereby directing the Committee to 
 
CHANGE, THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2001, § 2.2.2.1 (2001), 
available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/052.htm#2221). 
216 See id. at 6 (“The scientific evidence and consensus confirm that climate change is 
occurring and that humans have the capacity to abate climate change and the adverse 
effects of climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The global community 
thus has the ability to slow or reverse the climate-change-induced damage to Waterton-
Glacier’s resources of outstanding universal value.”). 
217 Id. at 7–8 (“1. Waterton-Glacier exists at a climatological crossroads where Pacific 
weather systems mingle with warm air masses from the south and east and cold weather 
from the north. 2. Waterton-Glacier contains adjacent mountain and prairie ecosystems. 3. 
Waterton-Glacier has tremendous scenic and aesthetic value. 4. The status of Waterton-
Glacier as the first International Peace Park is culturally significant because the 
designation not only “promote[s] peace and goodwill between nations, but also 
underscore[s] the international nature of wilderness and the co-operation required in its 
protection.” 5. The waters of Waterton-Glacier flow into watersheds linked to the Pacific, 
Atlantic, and Arctic ocean systems. 6. Waterton-Glacier is physiographically significant 
because it contains examples of Precambrian rock formations.”) (citations omitted) (citing 
World Heritage Committee, WHC-95/CONF.203/16, § VIII(A.1) (Jan. 31, 1995), 
available at http://whc.unesco.org/archive/repcom95.htm#354 (detailing the distinctive 
climate, physiographic setting, mountain/prairie interface and tri-ocean hydrographical 
divide as well as its scenic values and the cultural importance of its International Peace 
Park designation)). 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 8. Furthermore, the Petition drew a sharp contrast of global temperature 
fluctuations with those increases in the Waterton-Glacier region, noting that “the local 
summer mean temperature increased 1.66°C between 1910 and 1980,” and that this in turn 
led to “glacial melt, changes in hydrological systems, and species migration.” Id. at 9 
(citations omitted). And the Petition recounted the “rapid retreat of the glaciers,” id., and 
that climate change bore responsibility for subsequent adverse effects upon the 
hydrological systems of the parks, disturbances to the fragile ecosystem, and a reduction in 
the parks’ scenic value. Id. at 11–14. 
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focus on the specific issue of climate change and the dangers it posed 
to the parks.220 
In terms of relief, the Petition called for a broad national mandate 
to combat climate change. The Petition recognized the steps taken by 
the National Park Service to limit and decrease carbon emissions 
within the parks, but sought more active participation from the U.S. 
federal government as a whole. The call for a mandate included 
allowing the EPA to regulate carbon emissions under the Clean Air 
Act (prior to Massachusetts v. EPA) and a more expansive alternative 
energy regime.221 However, because the U.N. has no legal authority 
to direct the EPA to do anything under the U.S. Clean Air Act, the 
Petition aimed to invoke broader action from an international 
community to foster a dialogue about further protecting this area. 
In response to the Petition, UNESCO—in conjunction with the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature—undertook an 
elaborate study of the area.222 The scope of the investigation 
considered “the potential external threats to the property, including 
from mining and energy developments in the Canadian Flathead and 
Elk watersheds, and within the broader Crown of the Continent 
ecosystem, as well as the effects of climate change.”223 This 
evidenced a departure from the Petition and pronounced an 
independent assessment of the threats to the ecosystem. The language 
of the report suggests the importance of considering localized threats 
to the area—specifically, energy projects—rather than broader effects 
from climate change. In essence, UNESCO recognized the threats to 
the area, but pinpointed those threats as local as opposed to larger 
issues of climate change. 
In its analysis, UNESCO identified three discrete threats to the 
area: the adverse effect of mining and energy developments, the 
impact of barriers to wildlife corridors, and the general impact of 
climate change.224 Of these issues, mining and energy development 
 
220 Id. at 26. 
221 Id. at 18–19. 
222 PAUL R. DINGWALL AND KISHORE RAO, WATERTON-GLACIER INTERNATIONAL 
PEACE PARK (CANADA AND USA): REPORT OF THE REACTIVE MONITORING MISSION 
(2009), available at http://www.gravel.org/files/WATERTON%20MISSION%20 
REPORT%20FINAL.pdf [hereinafter UNESCO REPORT]. 
223 Id. at 3. 
224 Id. at 5–7. The report listed specific mining operations proposed in the area, with 
fairly precise calculations for the tonnage estimated from those operations: 
There are a number of current proposals that are under discussion and are the 
source of specific concern. The proposed Lodgepole coal mine producing an 
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posed the most serious threats to the area.225 Citing the damage 
caused by coal in the area, the report concluded that mining 
operations “would present a serious threat, incompatible with the 
Outstanding Universal Value of the Waterton-Glacier International 
Peace Park World Heritage property.”226 In fact, the report went so 
far as to say that any mining interest would create “an unacceptable 
direct impact” on the property.227 
The report then stated the procedure that the parties (the United 
States and Canada) should undertake in the event any such mining 
sites were proposed.228 These steps called for a precautionary 
approach and demanded a full environmental assessment of potential 
impacts before mining could proceed. According to the report, if a 
proposal came forward for any coal development, the parties should 
petition the International Joint Commission under the Boundary 
Waters Treaty.229 As discussed previously, Article IX of the 
Boundary Waters Treaty requires the IJC to perform an assessment of 
any threat to the region when petitioned by signatories.230 
 
estimated 2 million tonnes of coal per year over a 20-year period, would remove 
a mountain and fill a 6 km section of river valley with an estimated 325 million 
tonnes of rock waste. The proposed Mist Mountain coalbed methane gas 
production field, extending into the Flathead from the neighboring Elk River 
Valley, would result in wholesale landscape change over an area of about 326 
km, and the dewatering process involved in gas extraction would fundamentally 
alter the quantity and quality of groundwater aquifers and rivers. 
Id. at 5–6 (citations omitted). 
225 See id. at 6–8 (noting the environmental assessments each respective government 
requires in moving forward with any energy development, the problem of geographic 
dislocation (in that many proposed developments occur outside the protections of the 
heritage site, and it is the effect that is felt inside the area), a current moratorium on 
petroleum and natural gas production, and that “coal exploration and production is 
excluded from a coal land reserve covering almost half of the watershed”). 
226 Id. at 8. The UNESCO report focused on the likely impact upon:  
water quality that ranks among the highest anywhere in the world; rich aquatic 
ecosystems providing breeding and feeding habitats critical for the growth and 
survival of endangered migratory native salmonids; corridors of natural terrain 
and vegetation providing key migration routes for important wide-ranging 




228 See id. at 8–11. 
229 Id. 
230 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 71. 
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Furthermore, as previously discussed,231 the IJC has had the 
opportunity to preside over conflicts involving coal development in 
the area. Thus, the report reiterated the appropriate compliance 
process for either party in the event of coal and energy development. 
Beyond the lengthy disposition of the direct threat coal 
development would present to the area, the report summarily 
addressed barriers to wildlife corridors and climate change.232 
Similarly, the report gave only a cursory explanation of the impact of 
climate change, nonetheless emphasizing a need to maintain “the 
parks and the huge area of intact nature in the Crown of the Continent 
ecosystem [as they] provide the best available environment to allow 
resilience and adaptation for plants and animals faced with climate-
induced challenges to their survival.”233 Thus, the substance of the 
UNESCO panel’s recommendation for protection rested upon the 
detrimental impact mining would have on the larger area. 
The report became an important rallying point for those seeking to 
stop mining activity. UNESCO’s recommendations for protection of 
the area from mining added an international element to the local 
political forces that ultimately would stop the mine and protect the 
area. According to one scientist who worked in the Flathead, the 
recommendations of an international body against further coal mining 
put the British Columbia government in an “untenable position” to 
continue supporting resource development in the Flathead—despite 
the lack of any binding legal mechanism.234 
 
231 Hernandez, supra note 77, at 551 & n.38; see also UNESCO REPORT, supra note 
223, at 8 (“The mission team notes that the IJC examined a previous mining proposal in 
the Cabin and Howell Creeks of the Canadian Flathead, concluding that the potential risk 
of failure of waste dumps and settling ponds represented an unacceptable risk to the 
drainage basin. As a consequence of the IJC’s recommendation, this mining proposal was 
declined.”). 
232 UNESCO REPORT, supra note 222, at 6–7. When discussing corridors to wildlife, 
the report provided a cursory explanation of the danger of development to these corridors, 
but little in the way of actual solutions. Instead, it cited a need for further investigation and 
a corresponding conservation plan to ensure free mobility of species throughout the area. 
Id. 
233 Id. at 7. 
234 Jim Mann, A Mine Fight that has Lasted 36 Years: Science, Policy, Pressure Pay off 
with New B.C. Mining Ban, DAILYINTERLAKE.COM (Feb. 21, 2010, 2:00 AM), 
http://www.dailyinterlake.com/news/local_montana/article_c7a69c08-1ea7-11df-9cb6-001 
cc4c03286.html. 
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B. How Subnational Actors Generated the Will to Resolve the Dispute 
In the aftermath of the UNESCO report, and because of incessant 
political pressure from within Montana, government bodies in the 
United States began to take action. Montana’s Governor and 
congressional delegation weighed in strongly against the proposal.235 
Their approach was a two-pronged attack: Governor Schweitzer 
directly approached Premier Campbell of British Columbia while 
U.S. Senators Max Baucus and Jon Tester applied pressure through 
the State Department to address the issue through the IJC, or at least 
on a state-to-state level.236 In the end, it was the efforts of Montana, 
not the federal government, that gained traction. 
In a private letter between the U.S. State Department and British 
Columbia, the State Department “objected to a proposed open-pit coal 
mine in Canada near the Montana border, citing the potential for 
irreversible environmental damage to Glacier National Park, pristine 
trout streams and the largest natural lake in the West.”237 This federal 
involvement came at the behest of Senator Baucus, a longtime 
opponent to development in the Flathead region.238 However, and as 
previously noted, the Canadian government wanted Montana and 
British Columbia to address any issues or conflicts between 
 
235 See, e.g., Michael Jamison, Baucus Vows to Fight Planned Canadian Mine, 
MISSOULIAN (Sept. 11, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://missoulian.com/news/local/article_32a0 
cabd-744f-552d-bd96-257bc99222b6.html (“Sen. Max Baucus said BP should expect ‘a 
massive and unpleasant fight from Montana’ if the company moves ahead with a proposal 
to open southwest British Columbia to drilling and energy exploration. The senator also 
warned that fight ‘will end badly’ for BP.”). 
236 Jim Robbins, Coal Mine ‘Under the Radar’ Stirs Cross-Border Feud, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/15/science/15mine.html. At this same 
time, Senators Baucus and Tester had contacted the State Department and were seeking to 
exert pressure at the federal level. Id.; see also Blaine Harden, U.S. Objects to Proposed 
Canadian Coal Mine, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2007, 6:50 PM), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/09/AR2007030901443.html. 
237 Harden, supra note 236. 
238 See Press Release, Sen. Max Baucus, Advocating Investigation Into Canada Mine 
Plan (Mar. 13, 2007), available at http://www.gravel.org/2007/03/13/baucus-wants-
investigation-into-canada-mine-plan/ (stating to then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 
“There is now another proposal on the table for a coal mine in the same area. This 
represents a renewed threat of degradation and destruction of social, environmental and 
economic assets that are important to Montana. In the face of this threat, I strongly 
encourage you to request a hearing by the International Joint Commission on the current 
mining proposal. It is of the utmost importance to Montana’s outdoor heritage, and our 
nation’s environmental legacy, to stop this mine and protect the Flathead River basin.”). 
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themselves without resort to national bodies.239 Thus, formally 
invoking the Boundary Waters Treaty or other international 
agreements at the federal level was out of the question. Instead, 
protection of the Flathead depended on Montana and British 
Columbia addressing the issue. 
In 2005, the U.S. State Department declined to pursue an IJC 
referral. The State Department took the position that the fifteen-year-
old IJC report on the Cabin Creek mine “still stands” but did nothing 
to request a new IJC referral.240 Pressure from Montana’s senators 
yielded a private State Department letter to the Canadian government 
on February 23, 2007, roughly six years after the Montana delegation 
requested such action.241 While critical of the Cline mine, the State 
Department did not seek to address the dispute between 
sovereigns.242 
Efforts at the local level in Montana yielded more immediate and 
tangible results. Montana’s former Governor, Brian Schweitzer, was 
well-positioned to lead Montana’s efforts to stop mining. As a 
charismatic Democratic politician, he was re-elected in 2008 with a 
very strong mandate that included strong support from conservation 
groups, in a largely Republican state. He hailed from the town of 
Whitefish on Glacier’s western border near the Flathead River, and 
had a strong personal stake in the area. Schweitzer’s strong mandate 
also gave him credibility with the extractive industries that are 
important in Montana and he could thus work simultaneously to 
protect the Flathead from coal mining and promote Montana’s coal 
resource in other parts of the state.243 
The Governor’s chief legal counsel, Eric Stern, who was actively 
involved in negotiations with the provincial government, explained 
that the Governor made protection of the Flathead a high priority 
within his administration from the time he was elected in 2004.244 In 
 
239 Michael Jamison, Canada Wants Negotiations on State Level, MISSOULIAN (July 7, 
2005, 12:00 AM), http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/canada-wants                  
-negotiations-on-state-level/article_68554d30-d818-5d11-8a8d-4a1c67a9bbd2.html 
(discussing a letter from Charles Shapiro to Governor Brian Schweitzer). 
240 Harden, supra note 236. 
241 Id.  
242 Id.  
243 Mike Dennison, Land Board Approves Otter Creek Coal Lease, BILLINGS GAZETTE 
(Mar. 18, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana 
/article_fddc750c-32b3-11df-83df-001cc4c03286.html. 
244 For instance, Governor Schweitzer had contacted Premier Campbell as early as 
2005 to begin discussions on protecting the Crown region. Letter from Brian Schweitzer, 
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2005, Canadian officials attended a Flathead Basin Committee 
meeting to discuss long-term protection of the Crown. Lieutenant 
Governor Bohlinger spoke of the long history of mutual preservation 
dating back to the creation of the International Peace Park and urged 
British Columbia officials to work cooperatively with Montanans, 
labeling the Flathead as “an irreplaceable loss for all North 
Americans.”245 
Governor Schweitzer worked hard to cultivate a personal 
relationship with Premier Gordon Campbell and to impress upon him 
the importance of protecting the area.246 Though the U.S. State 
Department would not formally petition the IJC on this matter and 
questioned Montana’s unilateral efforts to negotiate an agreement, the 
Schweitzer administration researched the matter and found 
“numerous examples” of Memoranda of Agreement between 
provincial and state governments.247 Montana began pushing for a 
Memorandum of Agreement aimed at protecting the Flathead on both 
sides of the border. 
The Canadian government ultimately placed the Cline mine 
application on hold,248 and Premier Campbell and Governor 
Schweitzer continued to hold meetings in order to discuss substantive 
action to protect the North Fork and limit, if not ban, mining in the 
area.249 A one-sided agreement was never an option. Montana would 
have to do its part to protect the Flathead south of the border. Such a 
 
Governor of Mont., to the Hon. Gordon Campbell, Premier, Province of B.C. (Jan. 20, 
2006) (on file with authors). 
245 Speech to the Flathead Basin Commission, supra note 122, (on file with authors). 
246 Telephone Interview with Eric Stern, Chief Counsel for Governor Schweitzer (Nov. 
15, 2011). 
247 Id. 
248 See Patrick Reis, Planned British Columbia Coal Mine “On Hold” Until After U.N. 
Appeal, E&E PUBLISHING (July 2, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/stories/79909 (“The 
British Columbia government has put Cline’s application ‘effectively on hold,’ said David 
Karn, spokesman for the province’s Environmental Assessment Office.”). It is noteworthy 
that review of the mine proposal would likely become more substantive in 2010 under 
amendments to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, though it is unclear what 
leverage this created on the Canadian side. See Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 
S.C. 1992, c. 37 (Can.) (repealed 2012), available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts 
/C-15.2/. 
249 One of the major sticking points was whether any energy project would conduct a 
full and accurate environmental assessment “to assess potential impacts beyond the 
immediate vicinity of the mine site,” with draft agreements omitting such a provision. See 
Jim Mann, Schweitzer Asks Canadian Feds to Intervene, DAILY INTERLAKE (Mar. 23, 
2007), http://katehunt.com/fbc/cline/news/2007_3_22Govenor.html. 
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promise was far easier for Governor Schweitzer to make, as the state 
of Montana had no active coal mine leases and owned very little state 
land in comparison to British Columbia’s Crown lands. However, 
there were significant federal oil and gas leasing issues on the nearby 
Flathead and Lewis and Clark National Forests, and Montana brought 
those issues to the table. 
Governor Schweitzer made resolution of the Flathead mining issue 
a high priority in his administration, and persevered with meetings 
with Premier Campbell. For Schweitzer, it was the development of a 
personal relationship that helped bring Canada into a general 
agreement to protect the area.250 Obviously, the political cost of 
undoing an existing coal lease was potentially high on the Canadian 
side. As for Montana, there was little downside in the Flathead. 
However, the parties focused not just on resolving the Cline mine, but 
on the multitude of other potential oil, gas, and coal mining threats in 
the Crown on both sides of the divide. These efforts culminated in the 
execution of a Memorandum of Understanding with far-reaching 
implications for creating the prospect of sustainable governance not 
only for the Flathead, but for the entire Crown. 
C. Canada’s Position Is that Montana and British Columbia Should 
Address the Issue Among Themselves–a Premise Realized 
On February 18, 2010, the Governor of Montana and the Premier 
of British Columbia (as witnessed by the Chair of the Ktunaxa Nation 
and a Council Member of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes) executed the Memorandum of Understanding and 
Cooperation on Environmental Protection, Climate Action, and 
Energy between the Province of British Columbia and the State of 
Montana (“Memorandum”).251 Aside from the usual platitudes in the 
prefatory language, the Memorandum is remarkable for a number of 
reasons. 
First, the Memorandum is a subnational agreement; the United 
States and Canada are not signatories. Moreover, Montana and British 
Columbia intentionally reached beyond their own authorities to 
include Native American tribes on both sides of the border as 
 
250 Telephone Interview with Eric Stern, Chief Counsel for Governor Schweitzer (Nov. 
11, 2011). 
251 Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on Envtl. Prot., Climate Action 
and Energy between the Province of B.C. and the State of Mont. (Feb. 18, 2010) 
[hereinafter Memorandum], available at http://www.gov.bc.ca/igrs/attachments/en/MT 
EnvCoop.pdf. 
TUHOLSKI (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  12:24 PM 
2014] Solving Transboundary Pollution Disputes Locally: 707 
Success in the Crown of the Continent 
partners. Though the focus was initially on the Flathead, the 
Memorandum established a promise of mutual action towards 
protecting the entire ecosystem based on its “high water quality and 
aquatic biodiversity, and threatened and endangered species,” and 
based on the special wildlife corridor “that is home to the highest 
density of large and mid-size carnivores and the highest diversity of 
vascular plant species in the United States.”252 The signatories also 
acknowledged the importance of the UNESCO World Heritage 
designation. The Memorandum further acknowledged the growing 
threats to this pristine wilderness, notably balancing climate change 
against employment concerns (and doing so by focusing on job 
creation through “renewable and low carbon energy” industries).253 
The Memorandum established a framework for action by the 
signatories. It listed five major areas of collaboration for Montana and 
British Columbia: (A) remove mining, oil and gas, and coal 
development as permissible land uses in the Flathead River Basin; (B) 
cooperate on fish and wildlife management; (C) collaborate on 
environmental assessment of any project of cross-border significance 
that has potential to degrade land or water resources; (D) share 
information proactively; and (E) collaborate in responding to 
emergencies.254 
Most notable is provision (A), which calls for the removal of any 
mining, oil and gas, and coal development in the area, “subject to 
agreement on the equitable disposition of the financial implications of 
this action for the Province of British Columbia respecting existing 
mining and coal tenure holders.”255 Thus, while British Columbia 
was able to include a negotiating provision safeguarding the financial 
interests of local companies in the Cline mine, British Columbia 
committed to ending the mining leases. What is equally notable is that 
the agreement did not attempt to limit logging, did not call for the 
creation of additional wilderness or larger parks, and did not impose 
limits on recreational development. Indeed, the British Columbia 
government touted the successful integration of logging, recreation, 
and preservation with the Crown’s ecosystem as proof that human 
 
252 Id. at 1. The Memorandum also recognizes the reliance of local Native American 
populations on the resources of the Flathead River Basin. Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 1–2. 
255 Id. (emphasis added). 
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activities (aside from carbon resource development) are part of the 
sustainability equation.256 
The Memorandum also furthers the principle of cooperative cross-
border impact assessment by inviting collaborative efforts involving 
all of the stakeholders. It also takes a precautionary approach as well, 
by encouraging “proactive[]” planning and joint response to 
transboundary environmental emergencies.257 While the parties did 
not cede their jurisdiction within their respective borders, the 
Memorandum as a whole recognizes that the ecological reality of 
sustainable management must transcend political boundaries. These 
are important emerging customary norms of international 
environmental law. 
The Memorandum is just that: a symbolic, nonbinding statement of 
intent. It is soft law. Politicians on both sides of the border could have 
claimed victory and walked away from the agreement without 
effectuating substantive changes on the ground. However, the 
Memorandum became a spur to action that resulted in substantive 
environmental protection far beyond what could have been achieved 
through hard law mechanisms. 
D. Implementation of the MOU 
Subsequent actions on both sides of the border demonstrate the 
power of this subnational, soft law agreement. The first task was to 
buy out the Cline mine tenures. Governor Schweitzer worked hard to 
secure funding for the crucial buy-out of the Canadian leases. 
However, the U.S. federal government failed to become an active 
partner, underscoring the difficulty in getting the State to act in 
international environmental disputes. The Governor publicly 
lamented that “our federal partners have let us down” when Congress 
was not willing to provide the buy-out funds, once again 
demonstrating the unwillingness of the national governments to help 
resolve the crisis.258 
 
256 See, e.g., Press release, Office of the Premier, B.C., Mont. And Partners Unite to 
Sustain Flathead (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases 
_2009-2013/2011PREM0011-000138.htm (touting the remaining multiple uses of the area 
while lauding the efforts on both sides of the border to eliminate coal, oil, and gas 
development). 
257 Memorandum, supra note 251, § I(C)–(E). 
258 Matt Gouras, Schweitzer Says Federal Government ‘Let Us Down’ on Protecting 
North Fork Flathead, MISSOULIAN (June 4, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://missoulian.com 
/news/local/article_c8070e2e-6f44-11df-8726-001cc4c002e0.html. 
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However, due to strong local interest in protecting the area, 
politicians and NGOs on both sides of the border worked to secure 
private funding. In February 2011, The Nature Conservancy and The 
Nature Conservancy Canada signed an agreement with the mining 
company to purchase mining rights for approximately $9.4 million, 
which constituted the company’s sunk costs.259 The purchase was the 
result of substantial behind-the-scenes work of politicians on both 
sides of the border—notably the senators of Montana who took it 
upon themselves to launch a public relations campaign for the 
protection of the area—that resulted in the protection of 400,000 acres 
from mining.260 The buy-out marked a critical step in on-the-ground 
implementation of the Memorandum and represented substantive 
protection for this jewel of the Crown after three decades of 
controversy. 
The protection of the Flathead continues to unfold on both sides of 
the border. Montana’s senators secured the voluntary release of over 
200,000 acres of federal oil and gas leases in the Flathead drainage.261 
The North Fork Watershed Protection Act was introduced in the 
Senate in 2010, and hearings were held in May 2011.262 The 
legislation, which was not presented to the full Congress for a vote, 
would have withdrawn federal lands from further leasing and hard 
rock mining. These efforts, coming on the heels of the signing of the 
Memorandum, show how the subnational actors provided the political 
will for national legislators to begin to act. 
Long-term protection of the Flathead received a significant boost in 
November 2011 when the British Columbia Legislative Assembly 
approved legislation to protect 400,000 acres from further energy 
development. This legislation was introduced in the British Columbia 
 
259 Kirk Johnson, Montana: $9.4 Million to Protect Flathead River, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/science/earth/16brfs-94MILLIONTOP 
_BRF.html. 
260 Rob Chaney, Coal Mining Again a Concern in Canadian Flathead, MISSOULIAN 
(Nov. 28, 2012), http://missoulian.com/news/local/coal-mining-again-a-concern-in              
-canadian-flathead/article_101be164-390d-11e2-bcb6-001a4bcf887a.html. 
261 Press Release, Sen. Jon Tester, Announcement of Additional Lease Retirements 
Near North Fork of Flathead River (Feb. 17, 2011), available at http://www.tester 
.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1923; see also Press Release, Sen. Max Baucus, Baucus, 
Tester Announce Formal Commitment from B.C. to Protect the North Fork Through New 
Legislation, (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.baucus.senate.gov/?p=press 
_release&id=345. 
262 North Fork Watershed Protection Act of 2010, S. 3075, 111th Cong. (2011) (for 
more information, see http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s3075#overview). 
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Legislative Assembly to “preserve the environmental values in the 
Flathead watershed.”263 The purpose of this legislation, known as Bill 
2, was to affirm the commitments announced in the Memorandum.264 
The Ministry of Forests, Lands, and Natural Resource Operations 
explained that this legislation would address specific objectives, 
which include: (1) establishing coal and mineral reserves; (2) 
prohibiting Crown land dispositions for mining purposes; (3) 
prohibiting issuance of Mines Act permits; (4) prohibiting issuance of 
Oil and Gas Activities Act permits for oil and gas exploration and 
development; and (5) prohibiting disposition of Crown reserves under 
the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act.265 
The bill passed the legislative assembly on November 2, 2011,266 
and received assent from the Premier of British Columbia, Christy 
Clark, on November 14, 2011,267 thus becoming provincial law. 
Taking the law as a whole, it eliminates all mining activity beyond the 
limited exception for specific quarry operations, it closes all oil and 
gas activity upon the land, and it protects the land as a coal land 
reserve. Thus, the law achieves the aim of the Memorandum and 
codifies what could be seen before as, at best, a limited promise 
between neighbors. Passage of the law is a positive step in eliminating 
privatization of the Crown on the Canadian side, and reflects the 
growing strength of the larger movement within Canada to provide 
permanent protection for the entire Crown. 
Montana continues to fulfill its responsibilities under the 
Memorandum. Senators Baucus and Tester introduced the North Fork 
Watershed Protection Act of 2013 on February 7, 2013.268 The 
proposed act would withdraw federal land or interest both presently 
owned or acquired in the future from mining, mineral leasing, and 
geothermal leasing.269 The State of Montana has no direct control 
 
263 Legislation Introduced to Protect Flathead Watershed, BRITISH COLUMBIA: 




266 Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, Nov. 4, 
2011, available at http://www.leg.bc.ca/39th4th/votes/v111102.htm (“Bill (No. 2) intituled 
Flathead Watershed Area Conservation Act was committed, reported complete with 
amendment, and by leave, read a third time and passed.”). 
267 Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, Nov. 14, 
2011, available at http://www.leg.bc.ca/39th4th/votes/v111114.htm. 
268 North Fork Watershed Protection Act of 2013, S. 255, 113th Cong. (2013). 
269 Id. §§ 2, 3. 
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over these lands, requiring congressional intervention. The act would 
cover the geographic area of the North Fork Federal Lands, as set out 
in the accompanying map.270 The bill passed the Senate Committee 
on Energy and Natural Resources and continued on to the Senate on 
June 18, 2013, but has not come up for a vote as of the writing of this 
article.271 And while Senator Baucus has announced his plans to retire 
from the Senate, enacting meaningful legislation that will protect the 
North Fork remains a priority for his remaining months in office.272 
As a testament to the unifying impact the region can have, Republican 
Representative Steve Daines of Montana has announced his support 
of the bill and is lobbying within the House for its passage.273 This 
remarkable bi-partisan preservation effort was never seriously 
considered prior to the Memorandum, which, again, underscores the 
power of this soft law subnational agreement to spur action. 
VI 
WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THE FLATHEAD: PUTTING THIS CASE 
STUDY IN CONTEXT 
The story of the Flathead is remarkable for several reasons. It 
represents a success story in an era where transboundary 
environmental disputes are difficult to satisfactorily resolve.274  The 
pressure to develop carbon resources is difficult to thwart on both 
sides of the border—witness the already-renewed call for drilling in 
the Gulf of Mexico, even as the cleanup from the BP spill continues, 
and the seemingly inexorable push to develop the Alberta Tar Sands. 
 
270 Bureau of Land Management, Montana State Office, North Fork Federal Lands 
Withdrawal Area, MONT.: MAX BAUCUS, U.S. SENATOR (June 9, 2010), http://www 
.baucus.senate.gov/01312011_North_Fork_Federal_Lands_Withdrawal_Area_June_9 
_2010.pdf. 
271 It should be noted that this bill is the third iteration—or attempt to enact—federal 
legislation protecting this area. Baucus introduced the first bill on March 4, 2010; 
however, it died in committee. See North Fork Watershed Protection Act of 2010, S. 3075, 
111th Cong. (2010) (for more information, see http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111 
/s3075#overview). Baucus introduced the bill again on January 31, 2011, but it was not 
enacted. See North Fork Watershed Protection Act of 2011,  S. 233, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(for more information, see http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s233#overview). 
272 Douglas H. Chadwick, Old Man and the River: Senator’s Fish for Montana 
Waterway, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC DAILY NEWS (Sept. 1, 2013), http://news.national 
geographic.com/news/2013/09/130901-north-fork-montana-flathead-baucus-river-wilder 
ness-mining-glacier-park/. 
273 See id. 
274 See, e.g., Astrid Boos-Hersberger, Transboundary Water Pollution and State 
Responsibility: The Sandoz Spill, 4 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 103, 104 (1997). 
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Yet in the Flathead, coal, oil, and gas will remain in the ground on 
both sides of the border. Such a result is rare. More importantly, a 
potentially thorny transboundary pollution problem was avoided—it 
was stopped before it had the chance to start. International 
governance of an ecologically critical area has been furthered. What 
lessons can be learned from the Flathead dispute, and where does it fit 
in the context of international environmental law? Those questions 
are addressed below. 
A. The Limited Role of International Law and State Actors 
Substantive international treaties and accords did not resolve the 
North Fork dispute. The environmental dispute resolution provisions 
in NAFTA, the NAAEC, and the CEC offered no role in preventing 
pollution before it occurred. While the UNESCO Convention and the 
Boundary Waters Treaty did generate valuable information that was 
used by the public and politicians alike, the role of international law is 
subservient to the role that subnational actors and soft law played in 
actually solving the Flathead dispute. International law between 
national signatories standing alone proved inadequate. 
The weaknesses of the UNESCO Convention are obvious in terms 
of substantive law, as the United Nations could never compel the 
United States or Canada to act. Indeed, that is not the purpose of the 
Convention, nor how it operates. IJC jurisdiction under the Boundary 
Waters Treaty required affirmative steps from both signatories. This 
assumed that the United States would lodge a complaint due to the 
downstream nature of impacts associated with the mining operations, 
and Canada would then acquiesce to jurisdiction.275 But this U.S. 
complaint never materialized, evidencing the reluctance of the two 
national governments to assert themselves in an international 
environmental dispute (and again, Canada’s potential refusal to 
 
275 Hernandez, supra note 77, at 563–64. Hernandez points out that “[u]nder this 
provision of the Treaty, the United States could unilaterally refer the matter to the IJC. 
However, despite recognizing the need to refer the matter to the IJC, the U.S. government 
is unwilling to do so without the assent of the Canadian government.” Id. at 563 (citing 
Letter from Charles S. Shapiro, Acting Assistant Sec’y of State, to Brian Schweitzer, 
Governor of Mont. (June 6, 2005)). The letter from Shapiro to Governor Schweitzer states 
that though “[t]he U.S. Government has . . . stated repeatedly that it would welcome 
discussions with Canada concerning an IJC reference on coalfield development in the 
Flathead River basin[,] . . . Canada’s position is that Montana and British Columbia should 
address the issue among themselves.” Letter from Charles S. Shapiro, Acting Assistant 
Sec’y of State, to Brian Schweitzer, Governor of Mont. (June 6, 2005) (on file with 
authors); see also Jamison, supra note 239. 
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comply with a referral request to the IJC would leave the IJC without 
any authority to review the matter). Therefore, the Boundary Waters 
Treaty, standing alone, proved an ineffective means for preserving the 
Flathead River basin in this instance.276 
While the Boundary Waters Treaty was designed to resolve 
transboundary pollution issues like the North Fork, the signatories—
the national governments—did not utilize them. Instead, the United 
States and Canada showcased reluctance to address the transboundary 
environmental issues affecting the Flathead River. Far from an 
outlier, this approach, or non-approach, is becoming the norm. 
National governments have shown an increasing avoidance towards 
addressing these issues, thereby shifting the responsibility to other 
impacted or interested parties.277 Examples of the diminished role of 
states in resolving environmental conflicts include the Devils Lake 
dispute in North Dakota;278 a trail smelter case between the State of 
Washington, an Indian tribe, and a Canadian mining corporation;279 
and the “Softwood Lumber impasse.”280 As has been noted, while 
“relying on States to exercise national sovereignty to address the 
difficult problems [] offers attractions . . . [,] their effective authority 
in other areas [besides national security] is visibly diminished or 
seriously challenged.”281 Successful state-to-state resolution of 
transboundary pollution under international law such as the Trail 
Smelter arbitration, or other heralded success stories such as the Lake 
 
276 The Treaty has proven ineffective in another ongoing transboundary pollution 
dispute: Devils Lake in North Dakota. See generally Roland Paris, The Devils Lake 
Dispute Between Canada and the United States: Lessons for Canadian Government 
Officials, (Ctr. for Int’l Policy Studies, Feb. 2008) (on file with authors). The United States 
has refused to accept IJC jurisdiction in what would certainly be a loss for the nation 
because of the likelihood of polluted waters flowing from the United States into Canada. 
Id. The lack of resolution has been frustrating for both sides. 
277 Shi-Ling Hsu & Austen L. Parrish, Litigating Canada-U.S. Transboundary Harm: 
International Environmental Lawmaking and the Threat of Extraterritorial Reciprocity, 48 
VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 14–24 (2007). 
278 Id. at 15. 
279 See id. at 15–18 (noting that “the countries did not attempt to head off private 
litigation through submission to the IJC, even though the IJC had successfully adjudicated 
a transboundary controversy involving the very same smelter seventy years earlier”) 
(citations omitted). 
280 Id. at 18. 
281 EDITH BROWN WEISS, ASIAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN A KALEIDISCOPIC WORLD 4 (2009). Weiss goes on to explain that “[s]tates 
exercise authority over their territory and the people within their territory, and over other 
areas designated as being within their jurisdiction. They have a unique interest in ensuring 
the well-being of the people within their own State and the integrity of their territory.” Id. 
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Lanoux and Corfu Channel cases are less likely to provide viable 
models. 
Of particular note in this case is the reluctance of the national 
bodies to send the matter to the IJC, given their history of cooperation 
addressing transboundary pollution. From the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration282 to the 1988 resolution of mining issues in the Flathead 
region through reference to the IJC, the United States and Canada 
national governments have in the past taken charge of the issues in an 
effort to secure cross-border agreements.283 But here, this resolve to 
stay on the sidelines aligns with the above noted examples of State 
inaction. 
Indeed the failure of the national governments to address the issue 
aligns with what Professor Thomas Merrill finds as a broader failure 
within the structure of international environmental law to solve 
transboundary pollution issues.284 His premise that “the world’s legal 
systems have generally failed in their efforts to find a solution to 
transboundary pollution” stems from what he finds as “structural” 
defects in the way state actors approach transboundary pollution 
under international law.285 Chief among these structural problems is 
the post-Trail Smelter norm of near strict liability on the country 
hosting the pollution. Why should the host country enter into or 
enforce an agreement where it stands to unilaterally lose?286 
Enforcement of the Boundary Waters Treaty by simply imposing 
strict liability on Canada in the North Fork dispute would be a victory 
 
282 Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 86.  
283 INT’L JOINT COMM’N, supra note 174. The IJC introduces the issue it must address 
and the mechanism by which the issue arrived in the first pages of the report:  
In parallel letters from the Governments of the United States and Canada in 
December 1984 and February 1985 respectively, the International Joint 
Commission was requested to examine and report on the water quality and 
quantity of the Flathead River, with respect to the transboundary water quality 
and quantity implications of the proposed coal mine on Cabin Creek, a tributary 
of the Flathead River. 
Id. at 3. 
284 Merrill, supra note 62, at 934 (“In both international and domestic law, therefore, 
one sees a failure to develop an effective central regime for regulating transboundary 
pollution. Case-by-case approaches based on customary international law or American 
common law have failed to address the problem in a sustained fashion, and as a 
consequence no specific legal norms have been generated. Enacted law, whether bi- or 
multilateral international treaties or federal statutes, has also proven to be largely 
ineffectual.”). 
285 Id. at 1017. 
286 Indeed, Professors Sax and Keiter labeled the Cabin Creek IJC referral a “complete 
victory” for the United States. See Sax & Keiter II, supra note 164, at 295. 
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for the United States and a loss for Canada. That reality, coupled with 
the enormous complexity of relationships between the two countries 
on other issues, explains why the national governments did not 
intervene. 
In citing the failure of the Boundary Waters Treaty to resolve this 
dispute, we don’t suggest that the Treaty is not important. Certainly 
the study resulting from the Cabin Creek referral had enduring value. 
Both countries use the Treaty to acknowledge the importance of 
proactively managing the shared water resources—as evidence, 
witness the ongoing efforts to protect the Great Lakes. 
B. Creating New Legal Architecture: The Memorandum of 
Understanding Between Subnational Actors Embracing 
Transboundary Management 
Left to their own devices, British Columbia and Montana created 
their own solution. Neither of these subnational actors had the 
authority to craft a binding international agreement. At the same time 
nothing prevented them from memorializing a solution. The resulting 
Memorandum emanated from a nonbinding, soft law agreement 
bargained for between the subnational actors most affected by the 
dispute. The difficulty in the task was to draw in partners from both 
sides of the border and create an agreement that would be mutually 
respected and enacted.287 Furthermore, to the extent that these parties 
were negotiating on an international stage but were not the traditional 
participants in such a negotiation,288 the form and implementation of 
any agreement would have unique and novel consequences. This 
result is apparent from the individual steps each signatory undertook 
to achieve the purpose of the Memorandum. But the Memorandum 
cannot be viewed in isolation, and must be considered against the 
background of recognized norms of international environmental law. 
Against this background of established principles and approaches, the 
 
287 WEISS, supra note 281, at 9 (“The challenge for all peoples is to ensure that 
international law reflects shared values that bind people together and that it provides 
processes that all regard as fair and as ensuring accountability by States, nonstate actors, 
and individuals.”). 
288 See Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 798, 798 (2002) (explaining how the Peace of Westphalia more than 
350 years ago led the development of international law based upon treaties mutually 
agreed upon by co-equal sovereigns). See also Hall, supra note 89, at 135 (explaining the 
citizens and NGOs “are not a party to traditional formal international treaties and 
agreements under the Westphalian tradition”). 
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parties could negotiate an agreement that ensured mutual reciprocity 
while securing the threatened area.289 
Moreover, freed from the confines of a particular treaty, the parties 
were able to negotiate a more wide-ranging and inclusive agreement. 
Tribal governments on both sides of the border with a large stake in 
the Flathead were co-equal signatories. While the Memorandum is 
premised on halting coal mining in the Flathead, its ultimate impact 
extended to areas far beyond, when U.S. oil and gas leases were 
retired on the other side of the Continental Divide. Thus, the 
Memorandum could move the parties towards transboundary 
ecosystem management, though no law mandated it. Moreover, the 
parties included climate change concerns as a significant part of the 
agreement, ranging far beyond what would have been the focus of a 
more traditional dispute under international law. 
What remains to be explained is why British Columbia would 
agree to halt its coal mine, foregoing jobs and revenue during a 
recession, all to the benefit of Montanans. The answer to that question 
requires delving into British Columbia’s motivations, and 
understanding what Montana promised to give up in the future. After 
all, the Memorandum represents a mutually bargained-for agreement, 
crafted by experienced politicians who would be accountable to their 
constituents. Moreover, the Memorandum was developed without the 
threat of litigation or sanctions. 
To label Montana the “winner” and British Columbia the “loser” is 
wrong. While Montana did gain the promise to halt coal development 
across the border and prevent transboundary pollution of one of its 
prized resources, it gave up substantial development opportunities in 
other parts of the Crown. The State surrendered resource development 
opportunities on 17,000 acres of state land in the North Fork.290 
Montana convinced Congress to put additional acres of federal lands 
 
289 In essence, the parties evidenced traditional aspects of international agreement and 
decision-making in reaching their accord. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Dornbos, All (Water) 
Politics is Local: A Proposal for Resolving Transboundary Water Disputes, 22 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) (discussing “reputation, reciprocal non-compliance, and 
retaliation” in the context of water disputes and how these factors play into binding 
agreements and decision making). 
290 See Dan Testa, In North Fork Protection, Some See a Double Standard, FLATHEAD 
BEACON (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.flatheadbeacon.com/articles/article/in_north_fork 
_protection_some_see_a_double_standard/16894. The Montana Board of Land 
Commissioners, which overseas development of land owned by the State of Montana, 
voted to not lease any of the state lands in the North Fork drainage for carbon resource 
development on March 18, 2010. Id. Perhaps ironically, at the same meeting, the Land 
Board voted to lease 570 million tons of coal on state land in southeastern Montana. Id. 
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off limits to coal, oil, and gas. The loss of these development 
opportunities cost Montana future jobs and tax revenue similar to 
what British Columbia experienced when it cancelled the North Fork 
leases. 
British Columbia’s motivations for giving up coal leases can also 
be understood in the context of the province’s efforts to foster a 
greener image. British Columbia showcased itself to the world by 
hosting the 2010 Winter Olympics. The province invested hundreds 
of millions of dollars to insure the Games would be successful, with 
the stated goal of increasing tourism.291 In the years leading up to the 
Olympics, British Columbia cultivated its green image in a number of 
ways, including enacting a remarkable carbon tax in spite of Canada’s 
national about-face on climate change.292 Underlying British 
Columbia’s desire for a green image is the considerable economic 
engine sparked by the province’s tourism and recreation industries. 
British Columbia’s promotion of a green image and international 
destination for eco-tourism would not be served by a major 
international dispute over open pit coal mining in a pristine area, even 
if the Flathead itself is not a major tourist destination. Thus, British 
Columbia had ample motivation to see positive results from canceling 
plans for one relatively small coal mine.293 
Moreover, the sacrifices that both governments made in the 
Memorandum did not require surrendering mining opportunities in 
other places. British Columbia has significant coal, CBM, and other 
minerals elsewhere in the province. Coal is British Columbia’s top 
export, and the province has numerous active mines that are 
unaffected by the Memorandum.294 The British Columbia Ministry of 
 
291 B.C. OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC WINTER GAMES SECRETARIAT, BRITISH 
COLUMBIA’S INVESTMENT IN THE 2010 OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC WINTER GAMES AND 
RELATED ACTIVITIES (2010) (on file with authors). 
292 See generally David G. Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, 10 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 87 (2008) (discussing the approach taken by British Columbia in instituting a 
carbon tax). 
293 See generally Souchek, supra note 61 (providing a wealth of information drawn 
from media sources and government statements that help explain British Columbia’s 
motivation to cultivate its green image as it entered the world stage as host of the 2010 
Winter Olympics). 
294 British Columbia has two major coal export terminals, some of the largest on the 
West Coast. Ana Komnenic, India Signs ‘Cooperation Agreement’ with British Columbia 
Over Coal Exports, MINING.COM (July 29, 2013), http://www.mining.com/india-signs       
-cooperation-agreement-with-british-columbia-over-coal-exports-47914/. The province 
continues to develop its coal resources and seeks to become a key player in the 
international coal export market. Id. 
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Energy and Mines still touts CBM as a “significant” source of future 
jobs and revenue.295 British Columbia has plenty of other coal 
resources outside of the North Fork. Montana, too, is aggressively 
pursuing coal development in the Powder River Basin, far removed 
from the North Fork. Montana has some of the largest coal reserves in 
the world.296 Likewise, Montana’s oil and gas developments in other 
parts of the state have also prospered.297 
The Memorandum can be understood as the type of Coasian 
bargain touted as a model for solving transboundary pollution 
problems. Here, two actors of relatively equal strength were 
unconstrained by hard international law. Professor Merrill makes a 
strong case for the general failure of modern international 
environmental law to solve transboundary pollution.298 He argues for 
application of a “Golden Rule” approach that allows the parties to 
negotiate a solution without the threat of absolute strict liability for 
the host country based on the mutual self-interests of the parties. Here 
the mutual benefits to both parties transcended the mere halting of 
one mine in one drainage. Rather, the Memorandum allowed both 
parties to promote and expand their image as recreation paradises and 
showcase the incredible environmental resources of the Crown. The 
Memorandum allowed the parties to showcase a “made in 
Montana/B.C.” agreement that embodied (but did not have to pay 
fealty to) important international environmental law principles. 
Citizens and politicians on both sides of the border could point with 
pride to a significant international, ecosystem-based achievement. 
 
295 Ministry of Energy & Mines, Coalbed Methane in British Columbia, BRITISH 
COLUMBIA, http://www.em.gov.bc.ca/Mining/Geoscience/Coal/CoalBC/CBM/Pages 
/CBMBrochure.aspx#what%20is%20the%20current%20level (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
296 Montana has leased the Otter Creek tracts to Arch Coal to develop one of the largest 
coal mines in North America. See N. Plains Res. Council v. State Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 
288 P.3d 169 (Mont. 2012). Ironically, the state successfully fought a lawsuit to require 
environmental studies of the impacts of the leasing—an abrupt about-face from its demand 
that British Columbia conduct up-front environmental analyses. See id. Montana 
successfully argued that it could conduct an objective environmental review after receiving 
an 86 million dollar bonus bid and the company investing millions in finalizing mining 
studies. Id. 
297 In the 2009 State of the State Address, Governor Brian Schweitzer stressed the 
importance of the energy sector to the state of Montana. Brian Schweitzer, Governor of 
Montana, State of the State Address (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.pewstates 
.org/projects/stateline/headlines/montana-state-of-the-state-address-2009-85899394574. 
From 2005–2009, Montana’s oil production increased by thirty-eight percent and gas 
production rose thirty-four percent. Id. 
298 See generally Merrill, supra note 62. 
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The Memorandum is a fair bargain and thus it is easy to see why both 
sides were willing to quickly implement it. 
C. The Importance of Soft Law–Making Emerging Norms of 
International Environmental Law Real 
In Part II, we identified several emerging norms of international 
environmental law: (1) the duty to minimize or eliminate 
transboundary pollution; (2) intergenerational equity and the 
precautionary principle; (3) the importance of environmental impact 
assessment as a means to assist with a precautionary approach; (4) the 
public trust doctrine; (5) the principle of subsidiarity, resolving 
disputes at the local rather than state level; and (6) transboundary 
ecosystem management.299 These soft law principles clearly shaped 
and influenced the Memorandum. Though none could have been 
enforced in a tribunal, they operated as important, mutually-
understood background principles that were memorialized in the 
Memorandum, which in turn furthers their acceptance as legitimate 
governing principles. 
Canada could hardly argue that it did not owe a duty to refrain 
from creating transboundary pollution by approving a mine that 
would pollute U.S. waters. The 1985 IJC Report on the Cabin Creek 
mine in the North Fork, based on both countries’ joint referral, 
embraced the principle that the host country has an obligation to 
prevent or minimize transboundary pollution.300 That obligation is 
embodied in the Boundary Waters Treaty and the Trail Smelter 
decision. Canada itself has invoked the same premise when it seeks to 
prevent water diversions from the Missouri River watershed that flow 
into Canada because of fears of pollution from the Missouri reaching 
Canadian waters.301 Thus, both parties could agree to halt potential 
transboundary pollution by eliminating the mining leases. 
 
299 See supra Part II. 
300 INT’L JOINT COMM’N, supra note 174, at 8 (“Waters flowing across the boundary 
shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other.”). The 
IJC further explained that the issue was not whether the pollution itself crossed the border, 
but rather whether the pollution affected a transboundary fishery resource. Id. The 
Commission’s view involves a broad application of the duty. 
301 See Gov’t of the Province of Manitoba v. Salazar, 691 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(granting an injunction against diverting water from the Missouri River Basin across the 
Hudson Bay Divide to Minot, North Dakota, where it would flow north into Canada). The 
injunction was modified in March 2013, but the environmental review is not yet complete 
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The importance of a precautionary approach through impact 
assessment is also evident. Part I, sections C and D of the 
Memorandum provide mechanisms to help ensure that future 
development would be addressed through impact assessment. This 
achievement is noteworthy given Canada’s willingness to eschew 
such an assessment for the original mining leases and the inability of 
the United States to compel a full environmental impact assessment 
across its borders under existing treaties or conventions. The parties 
agreed to proactively share impact assessment information between 
their resource agencies. Recognizing the importance of 
intergenerational equity, the precatory language at the beginning of 
the Memorandum addresses what the parties term as their 
“obligation” to ensure the “protection, conservation and enhancement 
of our shared environment for the benefit of current and future 
generations.”302 In the same vein, the governments acknowledge their 
trusteeship duties over the natural resources of the Crown of the 
Continent, recognizing that this “unique” area “deserves special 
protection.”303 
The Memorandum is also a strong reflection of the norm of 
ecosystem management. It promotes the holistic management of the 
Crown, and furthers ecosystem management as a norm of 
transboundary environmental management between the two nations. 
The Memorandum’s introductory language recognizes the 
transboundary nature of the area’s water and wildlife. The cooperative 
impact assessment process recognizes that transboundary resources 
cannot be effectively managed as isolated political units. While not 
stated as a principle in the Memorandum, a desire to preserve the 
greater ecosystem of the Crown—not just solve the immediate 
problem in the North Fork—explains why the United States was 
willing to protect tens of thousands of acres of land from further oil 
drilling east of the Continental Divide, far removed from the Flathead. 
The Memorandum recognizes the need to involve all of the land 
managers from a multitude of state, federal, and tribal agencies in 
future transboundary management issues, not just the specific 
agencies involved in the North Fork dispute.304 
 
and the diversion is not operational. Gov’t of the Province of Manitoba v. Salazar, 926 F. 
Supp. 2d 189 (D.D.C. 2013). 
302 Memorandum, supra note 251, at 1. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. § I(B)–(D). 
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Finally, the principle of subsidiarity should be recognized as an 
important catalyst for the Memorandum. The State of Montana and 
Province of British Columbia are closest to the problem and have the 
most to gain from acting. The Flathead River is not likely a 
conversational topic in Ottawa or Washington, D.C., but it is a big 
deal in Montana and southeastern British Columbia, especially as part 
of the Crown. The inclusion of First Nation governments with an even 
larger (by many centuries) interest in the Flathead further underscores 
the ability of local governments to solve their environmental 
problems by working broadly at the local level. In addition, local 
NGOs with a direct stake in the outcome, such as the local chapter of 
the National Parks and Conservation Association, the Nature 
Conservancy of Canada, Sierra Club and The Nature Conservancy 
(United States), are the true unsung heroes of the Memorandum.305 
CONCLUSION 
The Memorandum represents a huge step in transboundary 
environmental cooperation between the United States and Canada. 
The Memorandum, crafted locally to solve a single dispute, has led to 
significant on-the-ground protection on both sides of the international 
border that extend far beyond just resolving the dispute over coal 
mining in a single river drainage. Whether the approach taken in the 
Crown can bear fruit in other transboundary pollution disputes 
remains to be seen. Against the backdrop of international 
environmental law principles, subnational actors bargained for a 
nonbinding agreement that they had the will to implement. The 
Crown is more broadly protected than ever before and the protections 
are permanent. International ecosystem management has received a 
huge boost. The Memorandum furthers a number of important 
principles of international environmental law. Moreover, the positive 
 
305 An in-depth look at the decade-long efforts of NGOs on both sides of the border is 
beyond the scope of this paper. NGOs played a critical role, right up to securing the nine 
million dollars by The Nature Conservancy and the Nature Conservancy of Canada to buy 
out the coal tenures. These authors are personally familiar with the tireless efforts of the 
Montana office of the National Parks and Conservation Association, both for its public 
relations promoting the importance of the Crown and for lobbying state and national 
politicians to protect the area. On the Canadian side, in addition to pushing for the 
withdrawal of the Flathead licenses, environmentalists from British Columbia successfully 
secured the creation of the Akamina-Kishinena in 1986 as an important link in protecting 
the Crown, even while the British Columbia government was leasing nearby lands for 
development. 
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results were accomplished in a relatively modest time frame: a few 
years instead of the decades it took to resolve the Trail Smelter or 
Lake Lanoux disputes. Montana and British Columbia have set the 
stage for a new chapter of international law and crafted a new device 
for the protection of natural resources and environmental regions 
which span the borders. 
 
